DETERRENCE, SECURITY DILEMMA AND ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENT: A STUDY OF NORTH KOREA AND PAKISTAN

Abstract

This paper examines the extent to which deterrence has motivated the acquisition of nuclear armament by North Korea and Pakistan. Nation-states involve in the acquisition of nuclear weapons to deter other nation-states with the notion that a nuclear attack by one would receive an overwhelming nuclear counterattack such that both the defender and attacker would be annihilated. This scenario has created a security dilemma and nation-states are grasping with fears. Both North Korea and Pakistan were involved in the acquisition of nuclear weapons because of adversaries that have constituted major threats based on ideological and religious differences. The paper adopted the neo-realism theory as its theoretical framework of analysis. The paper relied on a qualitative method of data gathering technique. It unravels that both North Korea and Pakistan’s adversaries have motivated them to acquire more nuclear weapons. Therefore, the paper concludes that North Korea and Pakistan could enjoy peaceful co-existence with neigbhours if they have enough deterrence.