THE REPENTANT BOKO-HARAM–MILITARY NEXUS: A RISKY PEACE-THROUGH-CO-OPTATION STRATEGY

Abstract

The Boko Haram insurgency has remained one of the most persistent security challenges confronting Nigeria since 2009, resulting in widespread violence, humanitarian crisis and regional instability across Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger Republic. While early counterinsurgency responses focused primarily on military force, the Nigerian government has increasingly adopted non-kinetic strategies aimed at encouraging defections and facilitating the rehabilitation of former insurgents. Central among these initiatives is Operation Safe Corridor (OSC), a deradicalisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration programme designed for repentant Boko Haram fighters. Although the programme is intended to weaken insurgent networks and promote peace, it has generated controversy over its security implications and legitimacy. This study examines the emerging nexus between repentant Boko Haram members and the Nigerian military institutions within the broader framework of peace-through-co-optation. Drawing on secondary literature, policy reports, and scholarly analyses, the study evaluates whether this strategy contributes to sustainable peace or introduces new risks. The findings suggest that while the programme has facilitated defections and reduced insurgent manpower, it raises serious concerns regarding community distrust, security vulnerabilities, and the erosion of justice for victims. The article concludes that peace-through-co-optation remains a fragile and potentially risky strategy unless accompanied by robust monitoring, vetting, accountability mechanisms, community reconciliation, and institutional transparency.