

## **AN APPRAISAL OF THE IMPACT OF ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY**

**Silas Idoko Abu**

(silasabu21@yahoo.com)

Department of Economics, Kogi State University, Anyigba - Nigeria

### **Abstract**

*The shortcomings in the efforts at curbing corruption in Nigeria had been prevalent. The record of success at various levels of government had fallen short of expectations, considering the proportions of funds the country loose to swindlers, contract scams and money laundering. These huge funds ordinarily if channelled adequately and managed accordingly in the absence of corruption were to stimulate the economic development of the Nigerian environment. However, the reverse is the case as corruption has come to be a part of the Nigerian process while threatening and retarding the economic development of the nation, despite the presence of notable anti-corruption agencies like the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). The journey 'so far' of the above mentioned anti-corruption agencies (i.e. ICPC and EFCC) in curbing the menace of corruption and ensuring the growth and development of the Nigerian economy is the central focus of this study. The study employs a systematic qualitative content analysis of secondary materials such as textbooks, internet materials, reports, newspapers and magazines, journal articles etc. The findings from the study revealed that the fight against corruption via the anti-graft agencies can only be won if the government decides to objectively allow the agencies to carry out their duties and responsibilities independently without interference. This is the most crucial way that the government can show its seriousness in winning the war on corruption through these anti-graft agencies. By so doing, the devastating effect of this evil called corruption would be minimised and the economy no doubt will witness positive changes and improvements to indicate the presence of economic development.*

**Keywords:** Anti-Corruption Agencies, Corruption, ICPC, EFCC, Development

### **1.0 Introduction**

The importance of development in the economic climate of any country in the contemporary world cannot be overemphasized. Development is relevant and needed in all aspects of the activities of all territories or entities existing as countries in the world of today. If development is really important as stated above, then what does it really mean? Development has been described simply by Encarta Encyclopaedia (2010) as the process of changing and becoming larger, stronger or more impressive, successful, or advanced or the act of causing somebody or something to change in the ways described above. In this regard, it is pertinent to highlight the fact that just like the family of a new born would desire to watch the infant grow and develop into an adult, the case is not different with a country or nation. This is because all well-meaning citizens and individuals in the country would desire to watch and see a nation grow and develop into something better.

Nigeria is one of the most blessed nations on earth, bestowed with vast human and natural resources. These resources if properly harnessed would have developed the country and Nigeria will rank among the top most developed nations of the world. Ironically, despite these abundant resources, Nigeria is still considered among the comity of nations tagged as underdeveloped or sometimes described as developing. Consequently, life expectancy and other indicators of development and wellbeing are not encouraging as opposed to what obtains in the developed countries. Many analysts have tried to investigate the factors responsible for

this sorry state of the Nigerian economy. Among the different factors exposed or revealed by analysts are bad governance, mismanagement of funds, misplacement of priorities and above all is the chief culprit; corruption. Corruption has been described as a social malaise that militates against good governance and it uses government expenditure (most times) as the channel or means to retard economic progress and development.

It is however pertinent to highlight the fact that corruption itself is as old as mankind and is not only peculiar to the Nigerian environment. The emergence and development of corruption can be traced back to the first man created to live on earth, Adam. Biblical accounts in Genesis 3, verse 1 to 12 has it that Adam and Eve had an interaction with the Serpent and the aftermath was having to go into hiding by Adam and Eve when God came calling (Ogundiya, 2009). The inference from the account is that Adam and Eve felt the need which should be satisfied not minding God's instruction against unequal yokes with deceptions.

Following the assertion that corruption is not only peculiar to the Nigerian environment, it is then important to highlight the fact that the magnitude of the 'evil' called corruption in the Nigerian economy is on the high side when compared with other countries of the world. It would be right to record that corruption is at its top in Nigeria because most Nigerians measure good life by flamboyant affluence and conspicuous consumption pattern. An individual in Nigeria whose age ranges between 18 and 45 years and yet has no house(s) and car(s) (exotic and sleeky) of his own is rather perceived as cursed and doomed for life. An attempt to prove to the world that one is not cursed and or doomed accounts for why many Nigerians indulge in dubious activities to cut corners to affluence.

Ogbeidi (2012) examined political leadership and corruption in Nigeria since 1960. He opined that that it is an incontrovertible fact that corruption has been the bane of Nigeria's development. Thus, without mincing words, the phenomenon has ravaged the country and destroyed most of what is held as cherished national values. Unfortunately, the political class saddled with the responsibility of directing the affairs of the country have been the major culprit in perpetrating the act. Also, Usman (1980) stated that pervasive corruption has remained a serious obstacle to economic development in Nigeria. Corruption inhibits human and social development as public institutions in Nigeria are only public in name, because they are run, in fact for the purpose of private accumulation of wealth.

Due to the effect of this evil called corruption, several administrations have at one time or the other put in place different anti-corruption or anti-graft agencies to curb or fight this social malaise. The institutional model for these anti-corruption agencies started in 1977 by the Jaji declaration by President Olusegun Obasanjo; the ethical revolution of Shagari in 1981; war against indiscipline by Buhari in 1984; National Orientation Movement by Babangida in 1987; war against indiscipline and corruption in 1996 by Abacha to the Independent corrupt practices and (other related offences) commission by Obasanjo in 2000 and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission in 2002 by Obasanjo (Gashinbaki, 2004). The institutional strategic model is therefore fathomed on the wisdom that anti-corruption institutions/agencies were established in Nigeria to perform the roles of 'deterrence, prevention and public sector reforms'. The journey 'so far' of the above mentioned anti-corruption agencies (particularly the ICPC and EFCC) in curbing the menace and ensuring the growth and development of the Nigerian economy is the central focus of this paper. The paper employs a systematic qualitative content analysis of secondary materials such as textbooks, internet materials, newspapers and magazines, journal articles etc

## **2.0 Conceptual Clarifications**

This section provides the operational clarification of the key concepts namely; 'Anti-corruption Agencies' and 'Development'.

## **2.1 Anti-corruption Agencies**

The word 'corruption' refers to an unethical behaviour which runs counter to the accepted social norms and moral values. It could also be described as an act involving dishonesty, illegality and non-conformity with accepted standard of behaviour. And such an act or behaviour has its main aim; the return for financial or material benefit, either for the person committing the act or on behalf of any other person (Igbaekemen et al, 2014).

The word 'anti' implies or basically means 'opposed to'. 'Agency' on the other hand refers to an administrative department or division (of mostly government) that is responsible for a particular function. Bringing the meaning of these three words together, anti-corruption agencies could be described as the division or administrative departments of government that is opposed to unruly or unethical behaviours/acts that are perpetrated by individuals/persons for selfish reasons.

## **2.2 Development**

The Merriam Webster dictionary describes 'development' as the act of growing or causing something (especially a country) to grow and become larger or more advanced in its activities. In the field of Economics, development is described as the process by which the economic well-being and quality of life of a nation, region, local community, or an individual are improved according to targeted goals and objectives (Todaro and Smith, 2011). "Modernization", "Westernization", and especially "industrialization" are other terms often used while discussing economic development. Historically, economic development policies focused on industrialization and infrastructure, but since the 1960s, it has increasingly focused on poverty reduction.

Amartya Sen (1983) (An Economist) describes Economic development as any policy intervention that aims to improve the well-being of people, stimulate economic growth, increase market productivity and Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

It is important to note that there is no precise definition of development. While economists in the 20th century viewed development primarily in terms of economic growth, sociologists instead emphasized broader processes of change and modernization. In the context of politics and political economy, development and political economy scholar; Karl Seidman summarizes economic development as "a process of creating and utilizing natural, physical, human, financial, and social assets to generate improved and broadly shared economic well-being and quality of life for a community or region" (Todaro and Smith, 2011). This definition seems to be more encompassing in the context of this study, and thus is adopted as the operational meaning of development.

## **3.0 Genesis of Anti-corruption Agencies in Nigeria**

Ever since Nigeria's First Republic collapsed in July 1966 amid allegations of massive corruption, the fight against corruption has developed into an important public policy issue. But current steps taken towards a corruption-free society in Nigeria are mainly a result of the efforts of the Obasanjo regime, which for eight years erected it as a major policy priority. The elevation of corruption to an urgent national issue by Obasanjo was itself motivated by a combination of some domestic and global developments. At the domestic level, Obasanjo's anticorruption drive was propelled by an unprecedented disclosure of evidences of corruption perpetrated by his immediate predecessors, especially the late General Sani Abacha, who ruled Nigeria from 1993 to 1998 (Enweremadu, 2010). After his death in 1998, his successor, General Abdusalami Abubakar, launched a probe into his financial dealings. These investigations uncovered large evidences showing that Abacha and his collaborators had diverted billions of dollars in public funds into several local and overseas bank accounts, while also corruptly acquiring choice properties in many locations within and outside the country.

At the global level, the war against corruption was motivated by a genuine desire to correct Nigeria's frequent appearance at the top of the table of the world's most corrupt nations. Between 1999 and 2003, Nigeria occupied either the 1st or 2nd position in Transparency International's survey of the most corrupt countries of the world (the *Corruption Perception Index*). This became not only a source of personal embarrassment to Nigerian officials travelling overseas, especially President Olusegun Obasanjo who was himself one of the founding members of Transparency International, but also an obstacle to the government's much desired goal of reconciling Nigeria with the international community, after many years of diplomatic isolation, of securing debt forgiveness, and much needed foreign investments.

President Obasanjo's anti-corruption strategy involved a wide variety of measures, prominent amongst them that saw the creation of the ICPC, EFCC, and the NFIU. Other anti-graft agencies include the Code of Conduct Bureau and the Code of Conduct Tribunal. Below is a brief explanation of the roles and mandate of these anti-corruption agencies

### **3.1 The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC)**

On 13 July 1999, President Olusegun Obasanjo submitted an executive bill titled Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Bill to the National Assembly for passage into law. This was barely six weeks after he was sworn into office. The bill aimed to outlaw all forms of corruption in the public sector and give legal backing for the creation of the ICPC to coordinate the war against corruption in Nigeria. Although, both the upper and lower legislative chambers as well as the state governments initially refused to recognise and approve the mandate of the ICPC as an anti-corruption agency for reasons best known to them, the Supreme Court on 7 June 2002 in a highly celebrated and landmark ruling, delivered its verdict in favour of the ICPC, thereby ensuring that the commission made a triumphant exit from the legal shackles which were threatening to paralyse the war against corruption.

### **3.2 The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)**

The EFCC was first proposed by a 2002 law, the Economic and Financial Crimes Act 2002, but came into existence only on 11 April 2003. Unlike the ICPC, the birth of the EFCC witnessed little or no controversy. Although its enabling Act contained far more 'draconian' powers than those of the ICPC, its passage in the National Assembly still proceeded almost without any political challenge. There are two explanations for this paradoxical situation. Firstly, being legislation that was more or less imposed by powerful international interests, it could not have faced the same kind of political opposition or legislative scrutiny which the ICPC Act attracted. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the EFCC bill was not considered a threat by Nigeria's political class, who erroneously interpreted it as a weapon against fraudsters in the banking industry or individuals specialising in advance-fee fraud (commonly known as "419" in Nigeria).

### **3.3 Code of Conduct Tribunal**

The powers of the tribunal to impose punishment includes but not limited to;

- If the Tribunal finds a public officer guilty of contravening any of the provisions of this Act, It shall impose upon that officer any of the punishments specified under subsection (2) of this section.
- The punishment which the Tribunal may impose shall include any of the following:
  - (a) Vacation of office from any elective or nominated office, as the case may be;
  - (b) Disqualification from holding any public office (whether elective or not) for a period not exceeding ten years; and

(c) Seizure and forfeiture to the State of any property acquired in abuse or corruption of office.

- The punishments mentioned in subsection (2) of this section shall be without prejudice to the penalties that may be imposed by any law where the breach of conduct is also a criminal offence under the Criminal Code or any other enactment or law.
- Where the Tribunal gives a decision as to whether or not a person is guilty of a contravention of any of the provisions of this Act, an appeal shall lie as of right from such decision or from any punishment imposed on such person to the Court of Appeal at the instance of any party to the proceedings.

### **3.4 Code of Conduct Bureau**

The mandate is to “establish and maintain a high standard of morality in the conduct of government business and to ensure that the actions and behaviour of public officers conform to the highest standards of public morality and accountability”.

To implement this mandate, Section 3, part 1 of the Third Schedule of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic gives it the powers to:

- receive declarations by public officers made under paragraph 11 of part 1 of the Fifth schedule of the 1999 Constitution;
- examine the declarations in accordance with the requirements of the Code of Conduct or any law;
- Retain custody of such declarations and make them available for inspection by any citizen of Nigeria on such terms and conditions as the National Assembly may prescribe.
- Ensure compliance with and, where appropriate, enforce the provisions of the Code of Conduct or any law relating thereto;
- Receive complaints about non-compliance with or breach of the provisions of the Code of Conduct or any law in relation thereto, investigate the complaint and, where appropriate, refer such matters to the Code of Conduct Tribunal;
- Appoint, promote, dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over the staff of the Code of Conduct Bureau in accordance with the provisions of an Act of the National Assembly enacted in that behalf; and
- Carry out such other functions as may be conferred upon it by the National Assembly.

### **3.5 The Nigerian Financial Intelligent Unit (NFIU)**

This body is the Nigerian arm of the Global Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). It is domiciled within the EFCC as an autonomous unit set up as part of the federal government effort in fighting money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities in Nigeria. The objectives of establishing the NFIU includes but not limited to:

- To enhance effectiveness and capacity in the detection and prevention of financial crimes
- To enhance and supplement financial sector supervision
- To facilitate the implementation of monetary policies by discouraging the development of an underground economy
- To promote Know Your Customer (KYC and know your customer’s business (KYC/B) in other to enhance due diligence culture in financial and designated non-financial institutions.

It is pertinent however to state that this study will focus only on ICPC and EFCC since they are presumably the most active and popular in the anti-corruption fight in the country.

### **4.0 The efforts of ICPC and the war against corruption**

Before the establishment of the ICPC in September 2000, Nigeria had not convicted anybody for corruption in a regular court. The inauguration of the ICPC, with unprecedented powers and promise of support from the highest level, therefore raised hopes of a new dawn. As Table 1 shows, within its first year, covering October 2000 to September 2001, four cases were brought before the courts for various corruption offences. This figure rose to 10 at the end of the ICPC's second year in September 2002, before peaking at 14 at the close of its third year in September 2003 (Awopeju 2015, and Igbinovia 2020). These stemmed from a total of 800 petitions submitted to the ICPC by different individuals and groups in conformity with the 2000 ICPC Act. At the end of the day, the ICPC could not secure convictions in these cases or many more that followed. The consequence was that by 2007, after more than seven years in existence, it had become more synonymous merely with its anti-corruption jingles advertised repeatedly on local television stations and with the term "toothless bulldog" (Enweremadu, 2012). Indeed, the ICPC could only secure one conviction involving two relatively minor individuals (the medical director of the famous Ahmadu Bello University Teaching Hospital and his finance director). The limits imposed by its own legislation, poor investigative skills and its own mishandling of investigations, insufficient human and financial resources, its management style, an inefficient judicial system, and constant attacks from politicians, especially federal legislators, all combined to create the basis for poor results and progressive loss of credibility.

**Table 1: Index of performance by ICPC (The ICPC Scorecard)**

Year	No. of Cases brought to the Commission	No. of Cases filed in court	No of Cases concluded	Convictions	Cash Recoveries
2001	44	4	11	0	N/A
2002	339	10	19	0	N/A
2003	295	14	17	2	N/A
2004	415	13	16	0	N/A
2005	570	11	17	0	N/A
2006	777	42	279	7	N56MM
2007	752	50	152	4	N382MM
2008	998	43	121	6	N42MM
2009	1008	24	117	7	N95MM
2010	1117	41	172	9	N91MM
2011	1017	23	117	4	N276MM
2012	708	21	60	5	N1.1BN
2013	1023	53	176	8	N709MM
2014	803	46	126	6	N590MM
2015	1107	47	142	8	N200MM
2016	1234	51	102	9	N670MM
2017	1204	42	132	8	N820MM
2018	1106	48	196	9	N950MM
2019	1246	50	201	11	N1.6BN

Source: Awopeju, 2015 & Igbinovia, 2020.

Table 1 shows that the total number of cases brought to the Commission were 15,763. The highest numbers of cases brought to the Commission were 1246 in 2019 while the least number of cases were 44 in 2001. These represented 7.9% and 0.28% respectively. The reason why 2001 cases were low was because of the fact people were yet to know the activities of the institution. The analysis further revealed that the highest number of cases filed in court was in

the year 2013 with 53 cases. This represented 8.37% of the total number of cases filed in court while the year 2001 had the lowest number of cases filed in court with 4 cases; this represented 0.63%. The total number of 633 cases was filed in court from 2001 to 2019. Also, the total number of cases concluded under period of study was 1884. The year 2006 was the year the Commission concluded highest number of cases. The highest of number of cases the Commission concluded were 279 cases. This represented 14.8%. 2001 was also the year the Commission concluded the least number of cases. The total number of cases was 11 which represented 0.58%.

In order to measure the performance of this agency/institution, conviction is a good parameter. One needs to examine the number of conviction secured relative to the number of cases filed in court. From 2001 to 2019, the total number of conviction secured was 103. The number of cases filed in court was 633. The convictions secured (103) were small compared to (633) cases filed in court. The percentage of convictions secured compared to the number of cases filed in court was 16.3% (Total number of conviction secured divided total number of cases filed in court multiply by 100). This is far below average. This shows that the ICPC is ineffective in fighting corruption in Nigeria.

Besides, Human Rights Watch (2011) argues that the most important measure of Nigeria’s anticorruption record is its success or failure in prosecuting corrupt nationally prominent political figures. The scorecard of the ICPC showed that its convictions were 52. Only 1 high level case led to conviction out of a number of prominent political figures such as Ghali Umar Na’Abba, the former Speaker of the House of Representatives (2002), Fabian Osuji, Head of the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Education (2006), Cornelius Adebayo, Head of the Federal Ministry of Communication and Transport (2007), Vincent Ogbulafor, PDP National Chairman (2010) etc that were accused of corruption. This was just meagre percentage of all the convictions made and it further revealed how ineffective the ICPC has been in fighting corruption in Nigeria.

### 5.0 The EFCC and its efforts in the anti-corruption crusade

On 11 April 2003, President Obasanjo inaugurated a second anti-corruption agency, known as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). According to information posted on its official website, the EFCC was created to “curb the menace of corruption that constitutes the cog in the wheel of progress; protect national and foreign investments in the country; imbibe the spirit of hard work in the citizenry and discourage ill-gotten wealth; identify illegally acquired wealth and confiscate it; build an upright workforce in both the private and public sectors of the economy and; contribute to the global war against financial crimes”. In other words, the EFCC was created to fight corruption, among other crimes.

The establishment of yet another anti-corruption commission can easily lead to the conclusion that Nigeria’s problem of corruption and financial crimes can best be overcome by the creation of more anti-corruption institutions rather than the strengthening of existing ones. The table below shows a list of some prominent cases handled by the EFCC from 2003 to 2020

**Table 2: Some Top EFCC Profile Cases (2003 – 2020)**

S/No	Name of Suspect(s)	Case Status	Amount involved	Status of suspect(s)
1	Ayo Fayose (former Governor of Ekiti State)	Arraigned on 51 counts	N1.2 billion	Case pending, granted bail
2	Adenike Grange (former Minister of Health)	Arraigned on 56 counts	N300 million	Discharged and acquitted

3	Joshua Dariye (former Governor of Plateau state)	Arraigned on 23 counts	N700 million	Currently in jail
4	Saminu Turaki (former Governor of Jigawa state)	Arraigned on 32 counts	N36 billion	Case pending, Granted bail
5	Oji Uzor Kalu (former Governor of Abia state)	Arraigned on 107 state counts	N5 billion	Jailed and subsequently released
6	James Ibori (former Governor of Delta state)	Arraigned on 170 counts	N9.2 billion	Served Jailed sentence
7	Iyabo Obasanjo (former Senator)	Arraigned on 56 state counts	N10 million	Case pending, Granted bail
8	Lucky Igbinedion (former Governor of Edo state)	Arraigned on 191 state counts	N4.3 billion	Case determined, ordered to pay \$25 million as fine
9	Gabriel Aduku (former Minister of State for Health)	Arraigned on 56 state counts	N300 million	Discharged and acquitted
10	Jolly Nyame (former Governor of Taraba State)	Arraigned on 41 state counts	N1.3 billion	Currently in jail
11	Chimaroke Nnamani (former Governor of Enugu state)	Arraigned on 105 state counts	N5.3 billion	Case pending, Granted
12	Michael Botmang (former Governor of Plateau state)	Arraigned on 31 state counts	N1.5 billion	Case pending, Granted bail
13	Roland Iyayi (former MD of FAAN)	Arraigned on 11 state counts	N5.6 billion	Case pending, Granted bail
14	Prof. Babalola Borishade (former Minister of Aviation)	Arraigned on 11 state counts	N5.6 billion	Case pending, Granted bail
15	Boni Haruna (former Governor of Adamawa state)	Arraigned on 28 state counts	N254 million	Case pending, Granted bail
16	Femi Fani kayode (former Minister of Aviation)	Arraigned on 47 state counts	N250 million	Case pending, Granted bail
17	Bode George (PDP Chieftain and former MD of NPA)	Arraigned on 68 state counts	N100 billion	Served Jailed sentence
18	Rasheed Ladoja (former Governor of Oyo state)	Arraigned on 33 state counts	N6 billion	Case pending, Granted bail

19	Senator Nichola Ugbane; Hon. Elumelu and others (Former National Assembly Members)	Arraigned on 158 state counts	N5.2 billion	Case pending, Granted bail
20	Hamman Bello Hammed (Ex CG Customs)	Arraigned on 46 state counts	N2.5 billion	Case pending, Granted bail
21	Adamu Abdullahi (former Governor of Nasarawa state)	Arraigned on 149 count charge	N15 billion	Discharged and Acquitted
22	Attahiru Bafarawa (former Governor of Sokoto state)	Arraigned on 47 count charge	N15 billion	Case pending, Granted bail by court
23	Hassan Lawal (former Minister of Works)	Arraigned on 37 count charge	N75 billion	Case pending, Granted bail by court
24	Kenny Martins (Police Equipment Fund)	28 count charge	N7.7 billion	Case pending, Granted bail
25	Esai Dangabar, Atiku Abubakar Kigo, Ahmed Inuwa Wada, John Yakubu Yusufu, (Police Pension Scam)	16 count charge	N32.8 billion	Case pending, Granted bail by court
26	Col Sambo Dasuki (Retd) (Former National Security Adviser)	18 Count Charge	\$2.1BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending
27	Olisah Metuh (Former PDP National Chairman)	6 count charge	N400MM	Served Jail sentence
28	Gabriel Suswam (Former Governor of Benue State)	32 count charge	N9.79BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending
29	Ikedi Ohakim (Former Governor of Imo State)	3 count charge	N270MM	Granted Bail, Case Pending
30	Dele Belgore (Former PDP Chieftain, Kwara State)	9 count charge	N450MM	Granted Bail, Case Pending
31	Ibrahim Shekarau (Former Governor of Kano State)	6 count Charge	N950MM	Granted Bail, Case Pending
32	Adesola Amosu (Former Chief of Defence Staff)	13 count charge	N21BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending
33	Sunday Ehindero (Former IG of Police)	10 count charge	N16.4MM	Granted Bail, Case Pending

34	Farouk Lawan (Former Reps Member, Kano State)	3 count charge	\$500,000	Granted Bail, Case Pending
35	Jonah Jang (Former Governor of Plateau State)	17 count charge	N6.3BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending
36	Danjuma Goje (Former Governor of Gombe State)	2 count charge	N25BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending
37	Adamu Aliero (Former Governor of Kebbi State)	3 count charge	N10.2BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending
38	Babangida Aliyu (Former Governor of Niger State)	8 count charge	N1.9BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending
39	Gbenga Daniel (Former Governor of Ogun State)	12 count charge	N211MM	Discharged and acquitted
40	Mukhtar Shagari (Former Minister of Water Resources)	4 count charge	N500MM	Granted Bail, Case Pending
41	Sen Godswill Akpabio (Former Governor of A/Ibom State)	8 count charge	N108BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending
42	Diezani Alison Madueke (Former Minister of Petroleum)	24 count charge	\$20BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending
43	Dr Peter Odili (Former Governor of Rivers State)	220 count charge	N100BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending
44	Adamu Muazu (Former Governor of Bauchi State)	12 count charge	N9.8BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending
45	Tafa Balogun (Former IG of Police)	8 count charge	N13BN	Served Jail Sentence
46	Aliyu Wamako (Former Governor of Sokoto State)	9 count charge	N13BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending
47	Ali Modu Sheriff (Former Governor of Borno State)	6 count charge	N300BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending
48	Alao Akala (Former Governor of Oyo State)	11 count charge	N11.5BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending
49	Sule Lamido (Former Governor of Jigawa State)	43 count charge	N1.3BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending

50	Musuliu Obanikoro (Former Minister of State for Defence)	13 Count charge	N4.7BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending
51	Kayode Fayemi (Current Governor of Ekiti State)	6 Count charge	N2BN	Investigation yet to commence
52	Jumoke Akinjide (Former Minister of FCT)	24 count charge	N650MM	Granted Bail, Case Pending
53	Ibrahim Shehu Shema (Former Governor of Katsina State)	24 count charge	N16.7BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending
54	Usman Saidu Dakingari (Former Governor of Kebbi State)	15 count charge	N700MM	Granted Bail, Case Pending
55	Bukola Saraki (Former Senate President)	13 count charge	N1.3BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending
56	Sen Stella Oduah (Former Minister of Aviation)	8 count charge	N9.8BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending
57	Sen Theodore Orji (Former Governor of Abia State)	12 count charge	N7.6BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending
58	Mrs Patience Jonathan (Former First Lady of the Federation)	15 count charge	\$15MM	Granted Bail, Case Pending
59	Mr Andrew Yakubu (Former GMD of NNPC)	12 count charge	\$9.8MM	Granted Bail, Case Pending
60	Isah Yuguda (Former Governor of Bauchi State)	15 count charge	N21BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending
61	Abdulrasheed Maina (Former DG, National Pension Commission)	25 count charge	N2.1BN	Sentenced to Jail
62	Babachir David Lawal (Former Secretary to the government of the Federation)	12 count charge	N544MM	Granted Bail, Case Pending
63	Mr Mohammed Adoke (Former AGF of the Federation)	14 count charge	\$1.1BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending
64	Mr Jonah Otunla (Former Accountant General of the Federation)	15 count charge	N6.3BN	Granted Bail, Case Pending

65	Abubakar Mallami (Current AGN of the Federation)	4 count charge	Illegal discontinuation of N25BN charge against Sen Danjuma Goje	Investigations yet to commence
66	Doyin Okupe (Special Adviser to former President Obasanjo)	5 count charge	N702MM	Granted Bail, Case Pending
67	Winifred Eyo-Ita (Former Head of Service of the Federation)	18 count charge	N570MM	Granted Bail, Case Pending

Source: HEDA Resource Centre, 2020

It should be noted that in all these cases none of the culprits was detained or served jail term apart from Chief James Ibori, Joshua Dariye, Bode George, Jolly Nyame, Orji Uzor Kalu and Tafa Balogun. Giving this scenario where these offenders are allowed to go scot free in what is presently referred to in Nigeria as ‘plea bargaining’, corruption therefore is a lucrative business in the country. Also, in a situation where people steal billions of naira and after their arrest and prosecutions such persons are only jailed for three or six months make corruption in Nigeria the most lucrative business in the world and further confirms that the EFCC is far from its goal of fighting corruption in Nigeria.

### 6.0 Comparing the efforts of the ICPC versus the EFCC

By all standards, the performance of the EFCC under Obasanjo was unprecedented in the history of anti-corruption institutions in Nigeria. In many areas that can be considered as central to financial crime – investigation, prosecution, conviction and recovery of illegally acquired assets – the EFCC can be argued to have recorded relatively significant successes. For instance, between the time of its creation in April 2003 and October 2005, it received a total of 3,758 petitions, out of which 526 were investigated (*The Punch*, 23 October 2005). By 2 June 2006, the number of petitions received had reached 5,400, while the number of cases under investigation and Prosecution was put at 2,103 and 550, respectively (*The Guardian*, 2 June 2006). The agency also recorded similar success in the area of loot recovery (cash from banks, buildings and other landed properties within and outside the country, vehicles, ships, aircraft, company stocks, etc.). The total value of what was recovered stood at \$5 billion in June 2006. The proceeds are usually returned to the victims, such as individuals who had been victims of 419, the well-known Nigerian scam. In other cases, funds were paid back to the public treasury, especially those seized from former and serving government officials, or those recovered from private companies which had defrauded the government.

In the area of arrest and prosecution, more than 3,000 persons were arrested and interrogated between April 2003 and June 2006. Furthermore, by 2 June 2006 there were at least 550 on-going criminal prosecutions (*Vanguard*, 2 June 2006).

But despite this level of achievement, the EFCC was widely criticised, even much more so than the relatively underperforming ICPC. The major source of criticisms was;

Firstly, that the agency was selective in its fight against corruption in the public sector, in the sense of going after only those that were perceived as not being in the good books of the powers that be.

Secondly, the EFCC was also harshly criticised for its tendency to violate fundamental human rights. This second criticism became much more pronounced when information

emerged that one of its high-profile detainees, Maurice Ibekwe, a member of the Federal House of Representatives, had died in its custody (*This Day*, 23 March 2004).

Thirdly, and perhaps more disturbingly, critical review of the list of convictions secured by the EFCC shows that the agency had very little success in prosecuting senior public officials, the brains behind much of the Nigerian corruption story. Most of those convicted were non-public officials. But while the EFCC was successfully prosecuting high-profile private individuals on fraud-related charges, it consistently failed to do so with members of the political class, whether appointed or elected. What explains this discrepancy? Does this mean that it has been too afraid to take on the ‘big political fish’? Or was it a deliberate strategy? The problem, however, was that taking on members of the political class required not only substantial institutional capacity but also a considerable amount of political support. Just as in the case of the ICPC, this support was largely non-existent.

**Table 3: Comparing the performance of the Anti-corruption Agencies**

Agency	Legal Instrument	Mandate/function	Focus/Target	Scorecard
ICPC	Established in 2000; Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000; Sections 12-22	Has mandate to combat corruption, including bribery, fraud and other related offences. The nomenclature delimits and defines its mandate	Directed at a battery of offenders: Public and Private	Very Negative (-)
EFCC	Established in 2002. Act Amended 2004. The EFCC Act of 2004. Part IV, section 14-18	Focuses on economic and financial crimes such as advanced fee fraud, money laundering, counterfeiting and other forms of fraud, graft and corruption. The nomenclature delimits and defines its mandate	Directed at a battery of offenders; Public and Private	Negative (-)
CCB	Established in 1989. Styled itself “Nigeria’s First Anticorruption Agency.” 1999 Constitution: section 2 (a) of the third schedule; section 18 of Fifth schedule; Paragraph 12 of Part I of the Fifth Schedule.	Charged with enforcing the Code of Conduct for Public Officers and Assets Declaration Regime. To ensure Public Officers conform to the highest standards of public morality and accountability, including	Directed at all Public Officers	Very Negative (-)

		corruption. The nomenclature delimits and defines its mandates		
--	--	--	--	--

Source: HEDA Resource Centre, 2020.

Table 3 shows the assessment of the ICPC by the stakeholders, newspapers, perception of Nigerians was very negative (-) in relations with the mandate and its focus/target. The question one needs to ask is; why is it that the ICPC is ineffective in fighting corruption in Nigeria? According to Ademola (2011), “political interference remains a major set-back to the anticorruption war.” Igbinovia (2020) corroborates this when he posits that the inability of anti-corruption agencies to perform effectively is vitiated by political interference. For instance, there are incessant withdrawals of cases by then Attorney General of Federation (AGF). Mr Muhammed Bello Adoke (AGF) who withdrew about 25 high profile cases eliciting criticism from the human rights community (Adewale, 2011). In his letter dated 28th of January, 2011 to the Acting Chairman of ICPC calling for the withdrawal of Minister of State for Health, Mr. Suleiman Bello’s case file who was alleged to have received ₦11.2 billion from Governor Murtala Nyako as “hardship allowance” when he was the Resident Electoral Commissioner in Adamawa state. Although, the AGF has power to withdraw a criminal charge against any person under section 174(1&2) of the 1999 Constitution, but the Constitution under sub section 3, says it must be exercised in the public interest and to prevent the abuse of legal powers. In case of publicly withdrawing of criminal charge against any person, especially corruption cases, this will serve as a great obstacle to the activities of the ICPC in its fight against corruption (Adewale, 2011).

Furthermore, slow judicial process also affects anti-graft war of the ICPC greatly. An ICPC official interviewed posited that “...our legal system, we have cases not really move on. If we say we are having challenges that show we are not getting enough results.” Another official interviewed also testified to the fact that the Commission is having a challenge of judicial process. He asserted that “the slow pace of movement of cases in the Nigerian judiciary as well as slow movement of all the ICPC cases that are being investigated by the police has tended to portray the ICPC as a non-performer to the society.”

Also, underfunding by government is also a factor that accounts for the institution’s failure. Poor funding has become an obstacle to the successful prosecution of corruption cases. Most of the innovative education and public enlightenment programmes designed by the Commission to improve public perception of corruption are not being executed for lack of funds. Apart from this, the Commission’s capacity to investigate petitions has not grown due to poor funding. According to former ICPC Chairman, Justice Ayoola;

*“Poor funding has become a menace to the successful prosecution of the fight against corrupt practices. As in some of the other agencies of government, insufficient funding is slowing down the war on corruption... Thus, clearly, the ICPC would require money to recruit more personnel in all departments, and expand its operations nationwide. By the ICPC Act, the Commission is expected to have offices in all the 36 states of the federation and Abuja. But it currently has offices in only 14 states due to inadequate funding. The result is that available staff are overworked”* (Alemika, 2012).

Apart from poor funding, lack of personnel accounts for institution’s failure to fight corruption. One of the ICPC officials interviewed stated that:

*The ICPC started with poor investigation and prosecution capacities because the petitions were not coming. So, the Commission had to strategically embark on mobilization, education and enlightenment of the people. Now the petitions come in a deluge! We are happy that the petitions are coming but unfortunately the petitions won’t investigate themselves. We have huge*

*petitions, but where are the personnel? We have doubled our programmes, we have tripled our activities, but the personnel that we have remain the same.*

According to the interviews conducted with the ICPC officials at one of the state offices; it shows that the ICPC has less than 800 personnel in all its 14 states and its headquarters in Abuja.

*...when you look at the ICPC with less than 800 personnel to deal with corruption cases, mind you, you cannot successfully deal with a corruption in two days, you will take the personnel to court, you have not finished another person is committing another. 800 personnel are too limited to number of cases we received. Mind you, out of that less than 800, less than 200 personnel are in Investigation Department, the other Department let say legal, so that people got to conduct the cases in court while the others are supporting staff in order to make the system works. How many investigators I have here? Only two, the work is really telling much on them.*

The above assertion indicates that the personnel of the ICPC are inadequate. The complexity of Nigerian state with about 170 million people requires lots and qualified personnel to fight corruption. In every single minute, a case of corruption is reported. Everywhere in Nigeria there is corruption and the war against corruption can be won if there is adequate manpower to fight the scourge.

### **7.0 The efforts of Anti-Corruption agencies versus Economic Development in Nigeria**

There is no doubt that the balance of the consequences of corruption is largely on the negative side. Corruption widens inequality, aggravates mass poverty, militates against efficient resource planning and allocation, undermines economic growth by discouraging investment; compromises economic efficiency; results in high governmental expenditures as a result of inflation of contracts and cost supplies. Corruption is poisonous to long term development and democracy (Alemika, 2012). The Nigeria’s 2011 Corruption Index by the EFCC maintains that Nigeria is certainly not immune to corruption. The damage of the scourge to the economy and the fabric of the society are seen in the schools that are not built, the hospitals without medicines, the roads that are not passable and the failure of the citizens to be inspired.

In Nigeria today, the greatest threat to corruption is impunity. Because of its sheer scale and level, corruption is no longer a secret, it is celebrated. According to Alemika (2012), corruption in Nigeria has endangered social, economic and political problems among others.

In this study, descriptive analysis using tabular presentation and qualitative trend analysis are used to expose the nexus between the performance of anti-corruption agencies and development in the Nigerian economy. The variables considered are the GDP per capita (GDP per cap) in dollar denomination, the Human Development Index (HDI) of the Nigerian economy and the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Both the GDP Per Cap and the HDI are used to proxy or represent Economic Development while CPI; which is an invention of Transparency International will represent the effort of the anti-corruption agencies in fighting corruption. The period of analysis covers 1999 – 2020, thereby providing an up to date analysis for the period in which the anti-corruption agencies came into operation

**Table 4: Figures for GDP per Capita (\$), Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and Human Development Index (HDI)**

<b>Year</b>	<b>GDP Per Cap</b>	<b>CPI</b>	<b>HDI</b>
1999	537.63	1.6	0.46
2000	552.19	1.2	0.46
2001	562.23	1	0.46
2002	568.97	1.6	0.44

2003	612.13	1.4	0.44
2004	797.88	1.6	0.46
2005	804.5	1.9	0.47
2006	847.54	2.2	0.48
2007	881.59	2.2	0.48
2008	911.96	2.7	0.48
2009	949.01	2.5	0.49
2010	995.68	2.4	0.48
2011	1015.82	2.4	0.49
2012	1030.17	2.7	0.51
2013	1055.84	2.5	0.52
2014	1091.64	2.7	0.52
2015	1125.43	2.8	0.53
2016	1145.32	2.7	0.53
2017	1162.34	2.7	0.53
2018	1173.76	2.8	0.51
2019	1182.67	2.6	0.52
2020	1182.97	2.6	0.51

Source: Tradingeconomics.com, Transparencyinitiative.org & UNDP.com

The relationship between the effort of the anti-corruption agencies and economic development in Nigeria can be better understood by examining and analysing the variables in Table 4. While it may be difficult to measure the effort of the anticorruption agencies in curbing corruption directly, objectively and quantitatively, an indirect measure of that uses corruption perceptions index (CPI) is relied upon in this study. The corruption perceptions index ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. A country or territory's score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 - 10, where 0 means that the country is perceived as highly corrupt and 10 means it is perceived as very clean.

From table 4, it could be observed that the higher the CPI, the higher the GDP per capita and the HDI respectively. However it could be pertinent to highlight the fact that a higher CPI implies a lower level of corruption and a lower CPI implies a higher level of corruption. Consequently, it will suffice to say that the tabular presentation suggests a negative relationship between the fight against corruption (i.e. CPI) and economic development (i.e. GDP per capita & HDI) in the Nigerian economy.

Above all, the corruption perception index (CPI) scores for Nigeria for the period under review are among the lowest (when compared with other countries) making Nigeria to be ranked among the top ten of highly corrupt countries of the world between 1999 and 2005. However, beginning from 2006 up to 2012 there was slight improvement in the CPI scores removing Nigeria out of the top ten of highly corrupt countries of the World. This perhaps may be attributed to the level of democratization currently in place in Nigeria and the establishment of anti-graft agencies like the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). Other recent researches have shown that the level of democratization of a country influences corruption perception index among other factors. Such that the more democracy grows, the more a country is perceived clean and vice versa. Given this scenario, the slight improvement in the CPI scores should be interpreted with caution since corruption perception index reflects

perceived corruption rather than actual corruption. Perception may not necessarily match reality. Again, the fact that Nigeria that parades itself as the giant of Africa but has CPI scores of less than 3 out of 10 between 1999 and 2020, thus implies that Nigeria is far from being perceived clean.

Similarly, even though the country's HDI has been rising, Nigeria's infant mortality rate has been estimated to be currently 99 per 1000 births, which implies that Nigeria has the thirteenth highest infant mortality rate in the world (CIA Factbook, 2018). The infant mortality of children under the age of 5 was 189 per 1000 births in 2007. These high mortality rates are mostly due to mothers not having enough money to take care of their children. Many mothers are also ignorant of some preventive measures such as immunizations and vaccines. Many children in Nigeria die as a result of malaria, diarrhoea, tetanus and other similar diseases. Most of these are preventable and curable diseases, but due to inadequate health care facilities and lack of money, far too many children die off from them. The inadequate facilities and money to attain a minimum living standard are offshoots of one political corrupt practice or the other on the part of government and public officers.

Also, many graduates in Nigeria wander the streets without anything reasonable to do for a living. The government is capable but unwilling to provide jobs for them. Employment in Nigeria is usually not based on merit but depends on how connected you are with people that have power. This leaves many highly qualified people in poverty as seemingly no one cares to know what they are capable of achieving. These people are missing out on the income they would have gotten if they were employed. The number of quality jobs in the economy is low and many government resources are misallocated thereby aggravating the level of corruption in the economy.

The following are some of the ways that failure of the anti-corruption agencies to fight corruption has threatened sustainable economic development in the Nigerian economy.

- i. Non-institutionalisation of democracy, rule of law, human rights and economic development
- ii. High incidence of conflict, violence, crime, insecurity and instability due to antagonistic competition, inequality, poverty and lack of access to basic necessities of life.
- iii. Erosion of values of hard work and integrity
- iv. Lack of access to productive opportunities and diverting energies of youth to crime, deviance, violence and sundry forms of anti-social behaviour
- v. Low foreign investment because of corruption induced bureaucracies and other obstacles
- vi. Lack of investment in the real sector by both foreign and domestic investors because of high profitability of contracts in service and supplies motivated by corruption.
- vii. Dependence on foreign sources for goods and services resulting in under development of indigenous technological and productive capabilities
- viii. Leakages of national assets to foreign countries through money laundering and conspicuous consumption
- ix. Misallocation of resources towards programmes and projects amenable to corrupt practices
- x. Perpetuation of patron – client relationships that undermine democracy, efficiency in public and private sectors
- xi. High cost of doing business and low investment in productive sectors resulting to widespread poverty and unemployment, high prices of goods, low purchasing power resulting in low capacity utilization by producers and manufacturers which in turn result to retrenchment of workers
- xii. Political ethno-religious and communal conflicts and violence as different groups in the society struggle to control state power as avenue for corrupt enrichment and ability to disperse patronages to their cronies, relatives and associates

- xiii. Loss of public trust and legitimacy by the government
- xiv. Poor social welfare conditions as indicated in table 4 above

### **8.0 Conclusion and Recommendation**

The shortcomings in the efforts at curbing corruption had been prevalent. The record of success at various levels of government including states and local government had been short of expectations, considering the proportions of funds the country lost to swindlers, contract scams and money laundering. The Acts establishing the Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) had been weak and ineffective. The agencies had been poorly funded and there were evidences of lack of political will by the crusaders to actualize an objective anti-corruption campaign and apart from this, the fight has been one-sided, vindictive, selective, and biased. The efforts have not yielded the desired results. Rather than abating it, it is festering uncontrollably. The campaign has been the instrument of the Presidency and his cohort 'deal' with opposition in order to serve as a deterrent to others who may want to go against the will of the state (the men in power). The point here is that this double standard; these warped treatments are in themselves acts of corruption.

Another fact is that the anti-corruption agencies are not independent of the government who funds and appoints its leaders. With the power to hire and fire being vested in the government of the day, the Commissions could hardly perform their duties without fear or favour. The present Buhari/Osinbajo administration did not only inherit corruption from the previous administration, they also inherited the weak and ineffective anti-graft agencies. From the foregoing, it will suffice to say that the Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) were and have been unable to perform their noble duties.

From the foregoing, the following recommendations have been highlighted;

- i. The fight against corruption via the anti-graft agencies can only be won if the government decides to objectively allow the agencies to carry out their duties and responsibilities independently without interference.
- ii. By allowing the anti-graft agencies to work independently without interference, the government would have indicated or showed its seriousness in winning the war on corruption through the anti-graft agencies.
- iii. Other issues that may be addressed includes increasing the funding to these agencies and also sanitizing the judicial processes and mechanisms to stimulate judgements.
- iv. When all these are further complemented with the right developmental policies and implementations, the Nigerian environment no doubt will blossom with economic development.

### **References**

- Achebe, C. (1984), *"The Trouble with Nigeria"*. Oxford: Heinemann Educational Publishers.
- Ademola, A. (2011), 'Endangering Good Governance for Sustainable Democracy: The Continuity Struggle against Corruption in Nigeria', *Journal of research in Peace, Gender and Development*, 1 (11), 307 – 314
- Adewale, S. B. (2011), "The crowding-out effects of corruption in Nigeria: An empirical Study", *Journal of Business Management and Economics*. 2(2): 059-068
- Alemika, E. E. O. (2012), *"Corruption and Insecurity in Nigeria"*, Lead Presentation at the International Conference National Security, Integration and Sustainable Development in Nigeria organized by Ahmadu Bello University (ABU), Zaria, November, 19 – 20, 2012

- Awopeju A. (2015), An Appraisal of Nigeria's Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (2001 - 2013), *Review of Public Administration and Management*, 3, (7), 7 - 17.
- CIA World Factbook (2018); Index Mundi: Nigeria Demographics Profile.
- EFCC Magazine, Vol. 3, No. 2, August, 2008
- Encarta Encyclopaedia, 2010 Version
- Enweremadu D.U. (2010), '*Anti-corruption Policies in Nigeria*', Discussion Paper, Friedrich-Ebert-Stifting Publishings, Wuse II, Abuja
- Enweremadu D.U. (2012), '*Anti-corruption Campaign in Nigeria (1999-2007)*' Published by French Institute for Research in Africa, University of Ibadan, Nigeria
- Gashinbaki, I.B. (2004), "*Anti-corruption: An evaluation of strategies, legislations and systems in Nigeria*", paper presented at the International Post Graduate Certificate Course in Corruption Studies, Hong Kong University, November 2004
- Human and Environmental Development Agency – HEDA (2020), "*A Compendium of 100 High Profile Corruption Cases in Nigeria*", 3rd Ed, by HEDA Resource Centre, Ikeja Lagos; Supported by MacArthur Foundation, USA.
- Igbaekemen G. O et al (2014), 'The effect of corruption on socioeconomic development of Nigeria', *Journal of Canadian Social Science*, 10(6), 149-157.
- Igbinovia, P. E. (2020). "Corruption and Anti-Corruption Agencies", Ayoade, J.A.A., Akinsanya, A.A., & Ojo, O.J.B. (eds.) *The Jonathan Presidency: The Sophomore Year*, Ibadan: John Archers Ltd.
- Merriam Webster Dictionary, 2010 Edition.
- Ogbeidi, M. M. (2012). "Political Leadership and Corruption in Nigeria Since 1960: A Socioeconomic Analysis", *Journal of Nigeria Studies*. 1,(2) : 1- 25
- Ogundiya, I. S. (2009), "Political Corruption in Nigeria: Theoretical Perspectives and some Explanations", *The Anthropologist*, 11(4), 281 – 292
- Ogundiya, I. S. (2012), '*A Nation in the Wilderness: Corruption, Elite Conspiracy and the Illusion of Development in Nigeria*' in Abdulrahman, D. A., Ogundiya, I.S, Garba, I.
- Oyebode, A. (1996), "*The judiciary, corruption and democratization*". In: A. Gboyega, *Corruption and democratization in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 81-90
- Newswatch, 3 March 2003
- Newswatch, 3 March 2002
- Sen A. (1983), "Development: Which Way Now?". *Economic Journal*. 93 (372): 745–62. doi:10.2307/2232744. JSTOR 2232744.
- The Guardian, 18 January 2002
- The Guardian, 2 June 2006
- The Punch Newspaper, 19th March, 2008
- The Punch, 23 October 2005
- The News, 25 June 2003
- The New York Times Magazine (2008) in Ademola, A. (2011), 'Endangering Good Governance for Sustainable Democracy: The Continuing Struggle against Corruption in Nigeria', *Journal of Research in Peace, Gender and Development*, 1(11), December, 2011
- The United Nations Global Programme Against Corruption (UNGPAC, 2012)
- Thisday Newspaper, 6th August, 2008
- Thisday Newspaper, March 23, 2004
- Todaro M. and Smith S. C. (2011), "*Economic Development*" (11th ed.). Archived from the original on 2018-06-23, Retrieved 2012-03-30., Pearson Education and Addison-Wesley, USA
- Transparency International Reports on Corruption 1996 – 2014

Usman B. (1980), ‘*For the Liberation of Nigeria*’, London: New Beacon books Ltd. pp 55 -  
70

Vanguard Newspaper, 24 May 2002

Vanguard Newspaper, 2 June 2006

Vanguard Newspaper, 16 February 2008