

PERMEABLE BORDERS AND INSECURITY: THE ECOWAS PROTOCOL ON FREE MOVEMENT AND TRANS-BORDER BANDITRY ON THE NIGERIA-NIGER REPUBLIC FRONTIER

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ABSTRACT

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established in 1975 as a sub-regional organization by West African States to primarily promote economic cooperation among member states. To realize this objective, the organization adopted the ECOWAS protocol on freedom of movement and the right of residency of citizens of member states in 1979. The protocol was aimed at creating a borderless sub-region through a single market, currency, and free tariff zone. However, after four decades, the content of the protocol remains operational despite numerous trans-border security challenges bedeviling the sub-region. It is on this premise that this paper interrogates the nexus between the protocol and trans-border banditry on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier. While the paper adopted the economic integration theory, questionnaires were used to generate quantitative data from the sample of 400 respondents drawn from the study area. While the responses were cross-tabulated, simple percentage and Chi-Square techniques were used to interpret each table. This study reveals that continuous implementation of the protocol has contributed immensely to the porosity of the Nigeria-Niger Republic borders, which warrants undocumented migration of ECOWAS citizens, thereby making the border a gateway for arms and trans-border banditry. While appreciating the positive impact of ECOWAS on member states, the article recommends that Nigeria can remain a member but to opt-out of the protocol is a better option to enable it effectively control trans-border banditry on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontiers.

Keywords: ECOWAS protocol, trans-border banditry, porous borders, insecurity,

Introduction

The quest for economic development and regional integration among West African countries necessitated the establishment of the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) in 1975. According to the ECOWAS Treaty, the central objective of this sub-regional organization is:

To promote co-operation and integration, leading to the establishment of an economic order in West Africa that is geared towards raising the living standard of citizens of Member States, enhancing economic stability, fostering economic relations among member states, and contributing to the development of the African continent (ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement 1979: p.1),

To achieve the above regional integration agenda, in 1979, ECOWAS enacted the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment of the citizens of the community, popularly known as the ECOWAS Protocol. The Protocol granted ECOWAS citizens the right of free entry and exit within the ECOWAS States for a maximum period of

90 days. After the commencement of the Protocol, member states were given 15 years to fully implement the Protocol. Within the first five years of the establishment of the Protocol, the use of visas into ECOWAS member States was to be abolished (ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement, 1979).

In an attempt to further consolidate the Protocol, article 2(2) of the Treaty requires member states to abolish all forms of obstacles preventing its implementation to build a solid foundation for regional cooperation and integration in the West African sub-region (Ochoga, 2019). Since its inception, Nigeria and other member states have been committed to the full implementation of the Protocol despite trans-border security exigencies of the moment. Thus, the emergence of armed banditry in Nigeria is enough recipe to question the inter-connectivity between the trans-border free movement and cross-border crimes in West Africa. Opanike (2016) argues that 'security of lives and properties in Nigeria seem to be more threatened now than before with the emergence of the Boko Haram insurgency and farmer-herder crisis. The banditry in Zamfara, Sokoto, Katsina, Kaduna, and the other North-Western States bordering the Nigeria-Niger Republic is a clear manifestation of a trans-border security challenge confronting Nigeria.

The former Nigerian Inspector-General of Police, IG Mohammed Adamu while briefing the quarterly Northern Traditional Rulers' Council Meeting reported that 1,071 deaths were recorded in crime-related cases and about 685 persons were kidnapped across the country in the first quarter of 2019. Needless to say, most of these murder and kidnapping cases are linked to trans-border armed banditry. A review of the breakdown of the figures shows that the North topped the national crime prevalence chart with 767 murder cases. The North-west led the chart with 436 murder cases followed by the North-central with 250. Zamfara alone as one of the seven states in the North-west has the highest national prevalence rate with 203 murder cases out of which 104 cases were related to armed banditry. Kaduna, Benue, Katsina, and Sokoto states recorded 112, 90, 21, and 19 deaths, respectively (Punch 2019). Consequently, people are living in despair and perpetual psychological trauma in the affected villages and towns as the bandits often kill and kidnap people recklessly.

Nigeria has one of the most porous borders in the world with 4,047 km (Hoffmann & Melly 2015). The borderland between Nigeria and Niger Republic is approximately 1500 km (Cross-border Diaries 2008). As of 2018, the Nigerian authorities confirmed the existence of over 1400 illegal entry points linking neighboring countries to Nigeria and 86 formal border posts (Dambazzau as cited in Business Day 2019). The porous nature of the borders is compounded by inadequate border security personnel, poor logistics, obsolete surveillance facilities, and corruption among the border security agencies. Furthermore, the difficult border terrain has created multiple unpoliced footpaths used by trans-bandits and other criminal elements to cross the border (Miles 2005, 297; Okunade 2017; Achumba, Ighomereho & Akpan-Robaro 2013).

However, the literature is uncertain whether or not the implementation of the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment comes with some cross-border security implications for member states. The cross-border security-related challenges of the Protocol such as illegal trans-border arms trading and banditry tend to undermine the national security of ECOWAS member states. Despite this apprehension, Nigeria continues to give much attention to the full implementation of the Protocol with little or no regard for the security implications associated with the protocol.

The questions that come to mind are:

- (i) Does the implementation of the ECOWAS protocol on free movement constitute a security threat to Nigeria?

- (ii) Has ECOWAS protocol made Nigerian frontiers a gateway for illegal migration into Nigeria?
- (iii) Has lack of effective border security governance fueled trans-border banditry in Nigeria?
- (iv) Are border security agents in Nigeria effectively fighting against arms trafficking?

Statement of Hypotheses

The null hypotheses are stated as follows:

H₀₁: Poor Implementation of the ECOWAS protocol on free movement does not constitute a security threat to Nigeria.

H₀₂: ECOWAS protocol is a gateway for trans-border banditry in Nigeria

H₀₃: Lack of effective border Security causes trans-border banditry in Nigeria

H₀₄: Border security agents in Nigeria are not fighting against illegal arms trafficking

H₀₅: Weak governance and ineffectiveness of border security forces does not limit the eradication of trans-border banditry in Nigeria

Based on the above questions and null hypotheses, the problematic of this paper is to interrogate whether or not there is a nexus between the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement, trans-border arms trafficking, and banditry, particularly the Nigeria- Niger Republic frontier.

Conceptual and theoretical underpinnings

There is no doubt that the recognition of the need for economic integration including the free flow of persons, goods, and services stimulated the enactment of Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment in 1979. The essence of the framework is to encourage, foster, and accelerate the economic and social development of the member states (ECOWAS Protocol, 1979). The first phase of the Protocol that guaranteed free entry of citizens from member states without a visa for ninety days was ratified by all member states in 1980. The second phase of the protocol that guarantees the right of residency to all citizens of member states was ratified by member states in July 1986 while the right of the establishment came into effect in 1990. Ever since the nature and character of the implementation of the Protocol have become a source of debate among scholars.

To start with, The ECOWAS policy of integration is anchored on the principle of unrestricted international mobility and free trade which is in line with the philosophy of the common market theory. The essence is to remove encumbrances that are capable of militating against the movement of citizens of the community and goods within the member-states (Ochoga, 2019). In other words, ECOWAS policy of integration believes that the international boundaries in Africa divided West Africans but these boundaries should prevent not regional integration. It is on this premise that Wilson (2015, p.4) contends that “the demarcation of the boundaries by the colonial powers divided territorial frontiers but the aged long economic and socio-political affection existing among border communities seems to make such demarcation a mere artificial exercise”.

This implies that the common practice was that every community know where its territory begins and where its ends. This kind of ancient border system was necessitated by the fear of the unknown which characterized the African societies in antiquity. The legal and administrative utility of the ancient African borders management system was aptly captured by Anene (1970) as cited in Asemanya (2006, p.21).

Generally, three types of frontiers zones may be identified in pre-colonial Africa. These are- zone of contact, zone of separation, and mixed frontiers zone. Frontiers of contact usually existed where different cultural and political groups lived side by side and

intermingled with themselves in normally well-populated areas. Most of the politically active groups were likely to acquire this type of boundary...

This implies that most areas of Nigeria's boundaries with other West African states have had frontiers separation. Considering that there was traditionally a border system based on heterogeneous communities typical of Nigeria and her West African neighbors. Thus, the take-home message from Anene's contention is that even the pre-colonial African societies had their system of the boundary of which security reasons are not excluded. In antiquity, this boundary system is rooted in enclaves but not the conventional frontiers in its sense. While boundary was not an obstacle to migration among the different ethnic groups that lived in the Nigeria-Niger, Benin border areas among others, the nomadic groups, especially the Fulani move freely from place to place, looking for water and suitable grassland for their cattle (Asemanya 2006). For instance, the nomadic occupation of the herdsmen who dominated the Nigeria-Niger border communities is to a large extent prepared the gateway for economic, political, and social integration of the communities with little or no regard to the security challenges of such influx. Thus, the forces of the historic integration have made the colonial boundary borderless. Before the Berlin Conference of 1884-5, those Nigerian border communities in, Sokoto, Zamfara, Katsina, and the Kebbi States that border with west African states were mainly fragmented independent communities (so-called stateless societies), who were subjected to no particular central authority. It is against this premise that Nasiru (2015) argues that 'earlier than now, mobility through the West African borders poses no significant security threats to other African states. Such migration was largely for economic interest.

While Nasiru (2015) argues that only colonial demarcation cannot completely abolish the historic political, economic and cultural integration of the Nigeria's border communities in the altar of mere boundaries but the exigencies of the moment call for security caution (Afolayan, 1988; Nasiru, 1999; Garba, 2016; Ochoga, 2019. Apart from the historical affection, the forces of marriage, religious and cultural similarities, trade, and political interest have further consolidated the historic integration among the communities. These epic phenomena encourage the influx of Nigeriens and other West Africans into Nigeria of which such interstate movement falls within the purview of illegal or undocumented migration.

The majority of West African migrants in Nigeria do not follow normal procedures (Nigeria Immigration Service, 2016) and as such, the Nigeria Immigration Service does not have their data which is not good for the country's internal security. This revelation called for concern as nationals of Niger, Mali, and other West Africa have been severally alleged by security agencies to be part of the Boko Haram sects and herdsmen posing a security threat to Nigeria and Nigerians (Daily Trust, Nigeria, 12, June 2012; The Sun, Nigeria, 25, August 2017; Daily Trust, Nigeria, April 12, 2018).

Thus, this revelation suggests that one major factor that enhanced insecurity, particularly in the northern Nigeria is the porous frontiers of the country's borderland with its neighbours. This is an indication that the porosity of Nigeria's borders has serious security implications for the country. Consequently, Nigeria is estimated to host over 50 percent of about 5 million illegal migrants in Africa (Edeko, 2011). Also, the porosity of the Nigerian borders has made it possible for the unwarranted influx of migrants from neighboring countries such as the Republic of Niger, Chad, and the Republic of Benin (Adepoju, 2002). These migrants who are mostly young men are capable of perpetrating crime in Nigeria.

In aligning with the above revelation by the Nigeria Immigration Service (2016), the nexus between the ECOWAS protocol and the national security of member-states shows a correlation. In other words, Nigeria's national security might be affected by the influx of West Africans and illicit arms into Nigeria under the vogue of ECOWAS free movement and trade policy. Ochoga (2019, p. 87) supports this viewpoint on the ground that "ECOWAS has paid so much attention to the economic and socio-cultural integration of member-states and its benefits, and little

attention to the security implications associated with the influx of foreign migrants occasioned by the forces of integration”.

It is within this gap that the argument of this paper is located. With the lingering security challenges and the inability of the security apparatus of the Nigerian government to guarantee safety and security in the country. Although, this paper observed that Ochoga’s submission did not dwell on the socio-cultural issues that can informally foster the ECOWAS policy on free movement and trade. Thus, the inherent issues such as ethnic fragmentation, cultural affinity, and the ethnopolitical cleavages of the border communities of Nigeria with other West African states are the forces of integration; that have made the borderline mere artificial boundaries and porous.

Secondly, the clamor for sub-regional economic integration by ECOWAS has been over-emphasized to the extent that, little attention on the security threat. Such influx of foreign migrants could pose to Nigeria’s national security is ignored. No wonder, Uba (2016, p. 45) categorically argues that economic, cultural, and ethno-religious integration of the border communities of Nigeria-Niger has propelled unrestricted immigration into Nigeria and its latent security threat to the country, particularly northern Nigeria. Hence, Nigeria continues to face serious security challenges connected with trans-border criminal activities in the name of ECOWAS free movement and trade policy.

While Uba’s argument is valid to rely upon, African countries generally have experienced direct, indirect, and consequential impacts of weapons proliferation. Thousands of people, – both civilians and combatants – are killed or injured every year on the continent. Yet, even when death or injury is avoided, small arms proliferation and misuse can dramatically impact a community, country, or region’s landscape. The threat of proliferation and use of small arms can undermine development, prevent the delivery of humanitarian and economic aid, and contribute to the refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) crises (Findley, Traoré, Ouedraogo, & Diarra, 1995).

Thus, despite the efforts of cross-border security agencies like the Nigeria Police, Nigeria Customs Service, Nigeria Immigration Services among others, the Nigerian borders have been described as one of the most porous allowing all sorts of cross border or trans-border criminal activities such as human trafficking, smuggling, drug trafficking, arm robbery, money laundry and illicit arms trafficking resulting to the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). For example, out of the 640 million small arms circulating globally, it is estimated that 100 million are found in Africa about 30 million in sub-Saharan Africa and 8 million in West Africa, alone. The majority of these SALW about 59% are in the hands of civilians, 38% are owned by government armed forces, 2.8 % by police, and 0.2% by armed groups (Lipsey, & Lancaster, 1956; Lipsey, 1957; Findley, Traoré, Ouedraogo, & Diarra, 1995; Nte, 2011 & Ochoga, 2019).

Similarly, Ochoga (2019) observed that, between 1999 and 2016, there were over 80 communal clashes, sectarian violence, and ethno-religious conflicts with each claiming hundreds of lives and properties, and internal displacement of women and children. The proliferation and use of SALW in ethno-religious clashes and armed robbery have led to the death of more than 10,000 Nigerians, an average of 1000 people per year since 1999 (Stohl & Tuttle, 2009). Injuries due to SALW have increased as much as ten-fold in rural and urban Nigeria because most homicides are committed using SALW.

While corroborating Ochoga’s thought, the aforementioned symptoms associated with Nigeria’s security challenges needs to be properly interrogated. This study argues that the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement has contributed in making the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier a gateway for trans-border arms hub of banditry. on the other hand, while the ECOWAS inter-state movement policy provides the legal framework, ethnic fragmentation and

cultural affinity of the border communities in Nigeria is encouraging the influx of Nigeriens and other west Africans into Nigeria.

The identity problem among the residents of the border communities is another contributory factor against effective border security governance. More so, the complexity of this problem is further compounded with the tendency for the similar ethnic groups in Nigeria to take advantage of the homogenous character of border communities of Niger and Benin for political gains within and around border communities of Nigeria. This complexity is also connected to ECOWAS Protocol on the Free Movement of persons. Thus, scholars established the impact of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement on transit-border crimes (Opanike & Aduloju, 2015; Peter & Asogwa, 2010). In this regard, Opanike & Aduloju have underpinned the latent effects of the implementation of the Protocol such as trans-border crimes. Ochoga (2019), collaborated this position further by submitting that the Protocol has not helped the security landscape of the sub-region. Though ECOWAS prides itself as the first region to initiate free movement, the Protocol is poorly implemented constituting more security concerns than boosting regional trade and economic development, encouraging smuggling of all sorts of commodities. That is why Peter and Asogwa (2010) stated that some of challenges that accompanied the Protocol were the spread and proliferation of transnational crimes.

Be that as it may, while there are so many works on the functionality and potentiality of ECOWAS integration policy, works that have tried to establish to link between the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and security of members states are few (Opanike and Aduloju 2015; Ochoga, (2019). While Opanike & Aduloju (2016) interrogated the impact of the Protocol on trans-border criminality, Ochoga (2019) established the implications of the Protocol on the national security of member states particularly, Nigeria.

Conversely, this paper interrogates the nexus between the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement, trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier, and the widespread banditry in Nigeria. Thus, this is the angle which this intends to contribute to Knowledge.

Methodology and theoretical framework

This research adopts a descriptive survey research design to collect and organize the data systematically to describe the relationship between ECOWAS Protocol and banditry in Nigeria (Oche, 2010; Adamu, Mohammed & Dandago 2010; Eneanya 2013). The study adopted qualitative data from primary sources particularly questionnaires and key informant interviews as instruments. While the questionnaires were distributed to Nigeria-Niger border communities in Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara, and the Kastina States respectively, the interview was conducted with border security personnel such as the Nigeria Immigration Service, Nigeria Police, Nigeria Customs Service, and the Nigeria Army at the border regions. The respondents were purposively selected from the regions where Nigeria has international borders with Niger from an aggregate population of 16,540,724, see table 1.1.

Economic integration theory is adopted by this article as a theoretical framework. The theory is associated with the groundworks of Viner (2014), Meade (1955), and Balassa (1961). The main assumptions of the theory is that the removal of tariff barriers among member states, having a common external trade policy that initiates common external trade restrictions against non-members, initiating free movement of goods and services, as well as free movement of factors of production across national borders, harmonization of policies, unification of national monetary policies, and acceptance of a common currency promote development (Viner, 2014; Meade, 1955; and Balassa, 1961).

The degree of economic integration ranges from free trade area to customs union, common market, economic union, and complete regional integration (Ochoga, 2019). In other words, the theory of economic integration has five components. Thus, this paper adopts 'the

Common Market theory'. According to the Common Market theory, the economic integration process extends beyond the elimination of trade barriers to the free movement of factors among member states (Ochoga, 2019). With this definition of a Common Market Theory, the viewpoint of Carbaugh (2004) on a common market has further shown its theoretical relevance to the ECOWAS framework of regional economic integration. Thus, the theory will guide this paper to establish the nexus between the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement, trans-border arms trading, and banditry in Nigeria.

Table 1.1: Population of Nigeria's States that border with

S/NO	Nigeria's Border states with the Niger Republic	Population Size
1	Katsina	5,801,584
2	Sokoto	3,696,999
3	Zamfara	3,314,043
4	Kebbi	3,728,098
	Total	16,540,724

Source: National Population Commission (2006).

The demographic characteristics of the population includes male, female, Nigerian, and non-Nigerian working in the border communities, literate or illiterate persons; civilian, military, para-military, and adult from 18 years of age and above. The civilian characteristics of the population consist of traditional rulers, community leaders, and religious leaders and opinions leaders in the border communities. The Para-military and military characteristics of the study population include officers and men of the Nigeria Immigration Service, Nigeria Police, Nigeria Customs Service, and the Nigerian Army working in the border communities. Invariably, it is within this population that the sample size was drawn from and questionnaires were administered to. Therefore, it was from this study population of 16,540,724 (see table 1.1) that the sample size was drawn from, using the appropriate sampling technique.

Sample Size Determination Format and Sampling Method

Since the study population is known, Taro Yamane's (1976) formula will be used to determine the sample size using a significance level of 0.0025.

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

where

n = Sample Size

N = Population of the Study

e = Tolerable error (0.0025)

$$n = \frac{16,540,724}{1 + 16,540,724(0.0025)^2} = \frac{16,540,724}{1 + 16,540,724(0.000625)} = \frac{16,540,724}{41351.81} = 400$$

Therefore, a total of 400 respondents were selected for the study.

The paper adopted the of use purposive sampling to distribute the questionnaires in the study area. The respondents were chosen based on their expertise and role in the Nigeria border security governance and ECOWAS Protocol knowledge. He exercises this judgment to what he thinks constitutes a representative sample concerning the research problem. In addition, to ensure that the numbers of questionnaires are proportionately distributed among respondents in each of the four Border States selected, the study adopted Bowley's (1964) formula as expressed below:

$$Nh = \frac{nNh}{N}$$

Where:

nh = number of questionnaires that were allocated to each of Nigerian border states with the Niger Republic

n = the total sample size

Nh = population in each Nigerian border states with Niger Republic

N = the population size

$$\text{Katsina } \frac{400 \times 5,801,584}{16,540,724} = 141$$

$$\text{Sokoto } \frac{400 \times 3,696,999}{16,540,724} = 89$$

$$\text{Zamfara } \frac{400 \times 3,314,043}{16,540,724} = 80$$

$$\text{Kebbi } \frac{400 \times 3,728,098}{16,540,724} = 90$$

Therefore, the questionnaires were shared among the four of Nigeria's Border States with the Niger Republic as indicated in table 1.2 below

Table 1.2: How the Questionnaires among the four States

S/NO	Nigeria's Border States with the Niger Republic	Population Size	Number of Questionnaires for each State
1	Katsina	5,801,584	141
2	Sokoto	3,696,999	89
3	Zamfara	3,314,043	80
4	Kebbi	3,728,098	90
Total		16,540,724	400

Source: Author's calculation using Bowley's (1964) formula

The reason for the adoption of Bowley's formula method of questionnaires' distribution among stratified study areas is to make the study more scientific and to avoid the fallacy of proportion and bias when distributing the questionnaires among the four states.

Data presentation and analysis

The qualitative data sourced with the aid of questionnaires were cross-tabulated using simple percentages to determine the average significance of responses to the research question. The Chi-Square statistic was used to test the hypotheses. Chi-square is most commonly used to evaluate Tests of Independence when using a cross-tabulation. It assesses whether an association exists between the two variables by comparing the observed pattern of responses in the cells to the pattern that would be expected if the variables were truly independent of each other. The calculation of the Chi-Square statistic is stated as:

$$x^2 = \sum \frac{(f_0 - f_e)^2}{f_e}$$

Where f_0 = the observed frequency (the observed counts in the cells)

and f_e = the expected frequency if NO relationship existed between the variables. As depicted in the formula, the Chi-Square statistic is based on the difference between what is observed in the data and what would be expected if there was truly no relationship between the variables.

Data Presentation and Analysis

Table 1.4.1: Occupational distribution of respondents

Occupation	Frequency(F)	Percentage (%)
Teachers	150	37.5
Farming/Trading	60	15.0
Military	20	5.0
Para-Military	170	42.5
Total	400	100

Source: Field Survey, 2019

The result in Table 1.4.1 indicates that 37.5% of the respondents were teachers, 15% are farmers and traders, and 5% are military while 42.5% are para-military. This implies that the sample respondents are dominated by paramilitary and military personnel.

Table 1.4.2: Implementation of ECOWAS Protocol Causes Illegal Immigration to Nigeria

Response	Frequency(F)	Percentage (%)
Strongly Disagreed	10	2.5
Disagreed	44	11.0
Agreed	146	36.5
Strongly Agreed	200	50.0
Total	400	100

Source: Field Survey, 2019

The result in Table 1.4.2 shows that 50% of the respondents strongly agreed that the implementation of the cause illegal immigration into Nigeria, 36% agreed that the implementation of the Protocol does cause illegal immigration into Nigeria, 2.5% strongly disagreed that the implementation of the Protocol causes illegal immigration into Nigeria and 11% disagreed that the implementation of the Protocol causes illegal immigration into Nigeria. This by implication means that the implementation of the Protocol causes illegal immigration into Nigeria.

Table 1.4.3: Lack of Effective Border Security Causes Trans-Border Banditry in Nigeria

Response	Frequency(F)	Percentage (%)
Strongly Disagreed	15	3.8
Disagreed	39	9.8
Agreed	156	39.0
Strongly Agreed	190	47.5
Total	400	100

Source: Field Survey, 2019

The results in Table 1.4.3 show that 47.5% of the respondents strongly agreed that lack of effective border security causes trans-border banditry in Nigeria and 39% agreed that lack of

effective border security causes trans-border banditry in Nigeria. On the other hand, 3.8% of the respondents strongly disagreed that lack of effective border security causes trans-border banditry in Nigeria while 9.8% disagreed that lack of effective border security causes trans-border banditry in Nigeria. This implies that lack of effective border security causes trans-border banditry in Nigeria.

Table 1.4.4: Nigeria-Niger Border is porous

Response	Frequency(F)	Percentage (%)
Strongly Disagreed	17	4.3
Disagreed	37	9.3
Agreed	152	38.0
Strongly Agreed	194	48.5
Total	400	100

Source: Field Survey, 2019

The results in Table 1.4.4 show that 48.5% of the respondents strongly agreed that the Nigeria-Niger border is porous, 38% agreed that the Nigeria-Niger border is porous, 4.3% strongly disagreed that the Nigeria-Niger border is porous and 9.3% disagreed that the Nigeria-Niger border is porous. This by implication means that the Nigeria-Niger border is porous. This means that immigration to Nigeria from Niger is not properly monitored

Table 1.4.5: Citizens of the ECOWAS Community Causes Crime and Insecurity in Nigeria

Response	Frequency(F)	Percentage (%)
Strongly Disagreed	15	3.8
Disagreed	30	7.5
Agreed	165	41.3
Strongly Agreed	190	47.5
Total	400	100

Source: Field Survey, 2019

Results in Table 1.4.5 shows that 47.5% of the respondents strongly agreed that citizens of the ECOWAS Community are causing crime and insecurity in Nigeria, 41.3% agreed that citizens of the ECOWAS community are causing crime and insecurity in Nigeria, and 3.8% strongly disagreed that citizens of the ECOWAS community are causing crime and insecurity in Nigeria. Meanwhile, 7.5% disagreed that citizens of the ECOWAS community are the cause of crime and insecurity in Nigeria. The result implies that citizens of the ECOWAS community cause crime and insecurity in Nigeria.

Table 1.4.6: Citizens of the Community Involve in Banditry in Nigeria

Response	Frequency(F)	Percentage (%)
Strongly Disagreed	20	5.0
Disagreed	26	6.5
Agreed	160	40.0
Strongly Agreed	194	48.5

Total	400	100
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Source: Field Survey, 2019

Result in Table 1.4.6 shows that 48.5% of the respondents strongly agreed that citizens of the community are involved in banditry in Nigeria, 40.0% agreed that citizens of the community are involved in banditry in Nigeria while 5% strongly disagreed citizens of the community are involved in banditry in Nigeria, and 15% disagreed that citizens of the community are involved in banditry in Nigeria. This implies that citizens of the community are involved in banditry in Nigeria.

Table 1.4.7: Insecurity in Nigeria is linked to Poor Implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Person, Residence and Establishment of Citizens of the Community

Response	Frequency(F)	Percentage (%)
Strongly Disagreed	10	2.5
Disagreed	44	11.0
Agreed	146	36.5
Strongly Agreed	200	50.0
Total	400	100

Source: Field Survey, 2019

The result in Table 1.4.7 shows that 50% of the respondents strongly agreed that insecurity in Nigeria is linked to poor implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment of citizens of the community and 36.5% agreed that insecurity in Nigeria is linked to poor implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Person, Residence and Establishment of citizens of the community. On the other hand, 2.5% of the respondents strongly disagreed that insecurity in Nigeria is linked to poor implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Person, Residence, and Establishment of citizens of the community. Meanwhile, 11% disagreed that insecurity in Nigeria is linked to poor implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Person, Residence, and Establishment of citizens of the community. This implies that insecurity in Nigeria is linked to poor implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Person, Residence, and Establishment of citizens of the community.

Table 1.4.8: Border Security Agents in Nigeria are Fighting Against Illegal Arms Trading

Response	Frequency(F)	Percentage (%)
Strongly Disagreed	25	6.3
Disagreed	49	12.3
Agreed	132	33.0
Strongly Agreed	194	48.5
Total	400	100

Source: Field Survey, 2019

Result in Table 1.4.8 shows that 48.5% of the respondents strongly agreed that border security agents in Nigeria are fighting against illegal arms trading, 33% agreed that border security

agents in Nigeria are fighting against illegal arms trading, 6.3% strongly disagreed that border security agents in Nigeria are fighting against illegal arms trading, and 12.3% disagreed that border security agents in Nigeria are fighting against illegal arms trading. This by implication means border security.

Table 1.4.9: Border Security Agents in Nigeria are not doing enough to stop Trans-border banditry in Nigeria

Response	Frequency(F)	Percentage (%)
Strongly Disagreed	17	4.3
Disagreed	37	9.3
Agreed	156	39.0
Strongly Agreed	190	47.5
Total	400	100

Source: Field Survey, 2019

The result in Table 1.4.9 shows that 47.5% of the respondents strongly agreed that border security agents in Nigeria are not doing enough to stop trans-border banditry in the country, 39% agreed that border security agents in Nigeria are not doing enough to stop trans-border banditry in the country, 4.3% strongly disagreed that border security agents in Nigeria are not doing enough to stop trans-border banditry in the country, and 9.3% disagreed that border security agents in Nigeria are not doing enough to stop trans-border banditry in country. This implies that border security agents in Nigeria are not doing enough to stop trans-border banditry in the country.

Table 1.4.10: The ECOWAS is a gateway for illegal migration into Nigeria

Response	Frequency(F)	Percentage (%)
Strongly Disagreed	10	2.5
Disagreed	44	11.0
Agreed	146	36.5
Strongly Agreed	200	50.0
Total	400	100

Source: Field Survey, 2019

Result in Table 1.4.10 shows that 50% of the respondents strongly agreed the ECOWAS is a gateway for illegal migration into Nigeria, 36.5% agreed that the ECOWAS is a gateway for illegal migration into Nigeria, and 2.5% strongly disagreed that the ECOWAS is a gateway for illegal migration into Nigeria. Meanwhile, 11% disagreed that the ECOWAS is a gateway for illegal migration into Nigeria. This implies that the ECOWAS is a gateway for illegal migration into Nigeria.

Table 1.4.11: The Poor Implementation of the Protocol is Link to Insecurity in Nigeria

Response	Frequency(F)	Percentage(%)
Strongly Disagreed	29	7.2

Disagreed	35	8.8
Agreed	144	36.0
Strongly Agreed	192	48.0
Total	400	100

Source: Field Survey, 2019

Result in Table 1.4.11 shows that 48% of the respondents strongly agreed that the poor implementation of the Protocol is linked to insecurity in Nigeria, 36% agreed that the poor implementation of the Protocol is linked to insecurity in Nigeria, 7.2% strongly disagreed that the poor implementation of the Protocol is linked to insecurity in Nigeria, and 8.8% disagreed that the poor implementation of the Protocol is linked to insecurity in Nigeria. This implies that the poor implementation of the Protocol is linked to insecurity in Nigeria.

Table 1.4.12: Weak Governance and Ineffectiveness of Border Security Forces Limiting the Eradication of Trans-border Banditry in Nigeria

Response	Frequency(F)	Percentage (%)
Strongly Disagreed	25	6.3
Disagreed	51	12.8
Agreed	134	33.5
Strongly Agreed	190	47.5
Total	400	100

Source: Field Survey, 2019

Table 1.4.12 shows that 47.5% of the respondents strongly agreed that weak governance and ineffectiveness of border security forces limit the eradication of trans-border banditry in Nigeria and 33.5% agreed that weak governance and ineffectiveness of border security forces limit the eradication of trans-border banditry in Nigeria. On the other hand, 6.3% of the respondents strongly disagreed that weak governance and ineffectiveness of border security forces limiting the eradication of trans-border banditry in Nigeria and 12.8% disagreed that weak governance and ineffectiveness of border security forces limiting the eradication of trans-border banditry in Nigeria. This by implication means that weak governance and ineffectiveness of border security forces limit the eradication of trans-border banditry in Nigeria.

Table 1.4.13: Nigeria's Continuous Implementation of the Protocol Poses More Security Risk to the Country

Response	Frequency(F)	Percentage (%)
Strongly Disagreed	10	2.5
Disagreed	44	11.0
Agreed	146	36.5
Strongly Agreed	200	50.0
Total	400	100

Source: Field Survey, 2019

The result in Table 1.4.13 shows that 50% of the respondents strongly agreed that Nigeria's continuous implementation of the Protocol poses more security risks to the country while

36.5% agreed that Nigeria's continuous implementation of the Protocol poses more security risks to the country. On the other hand, 2.5% of the respondents strongly disagreed that Nigeria's continuous implementation of the Protocol poses more security risk to the country and 11% disagreed that Nigeria's continuous implementation of the Protocol poses more security risk to the country. This implies that Nigeria's continuous implementation of the Protocol poses more security risks to the country.

Table 1.4.14: The Creation Border Wall Reduce Illegal Arms Trading and Banditry in Nigeria

Response	Frequency(F)	Percentage (%)
Strongly Disagreed	19	4.8
Disagreed	35	8.8
Agreed	156	39.0
Strongly Agreed	190	47.5
Total	400	100

Source: Field Survey, 2019

The result in Table 1.4.14 shows that 47.5% of the respondents strongly agreed that the creation border wall reduces illegal arms trading and banditry in Nigeria and 39% agreed that the creation border wall reduces illegal arms trading and banditry in Nigeria. On the other hand, 4.8% of the respondents strongly disagreed that the creation border wall reduces illegal arms trading and banditry in Nigeria while only 8.8% disagreed that creating a border wall reduces illegal arms trading and banditry in Nigeria. This by implication means that the creation of a border wall reduces illegal arms trading and banditry in Nigeria.

Table 1.4.15: Nigeria's Pulling Out of Implementing the Protocol a Better Option

Response	Frequency(F)	Percentage (%)
Strongly Disagreed	24	6.0
Disagreed	30	7.5
Agreed	156	39.0
Strongly Agreed	190	47.5
Total	400	100

Source: Field Survey, 2019

The result in Table 1.4.15 shows that 47.5% of the respondents strongly agreed that Nigeria's pulling out of implementing the Protocol is a better option and 39% agreed that Nigeria's pulling out of implementing the Protocol is a better option. On the other hand, 6% of the respondents strongly disagreed that Nigeria's pulling out of implementing the Protocol was a better option while 7.5% disagreed that Nigeria's pulling out of implementing the Protocol was a better option. This implies that Nigeria's pulling out of implementing the Protocol is a better option.

Test of Research Hypotheses

In testing for hypothesis one (H₀₁: Poor Implementation of the ECOWAS protocol on free movement does not constitute a security threat to Nigeria), the study estimated chi-square and the results are presented in Table 1.4.16.

Table 1.4.16: Insecurity in Nigeria is linked to Poor Implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Person, Residence and Establishment of Citizens of the Community.

Chi-Square Value	233.520
Df	3
Asymp. Sig.	0.000

Source: Extractions from SPSS 23 Output

The result shows a chi-square value of 233.52 with a degree of freedom of 3 and an asymptotic probability value of 0.000 ($P=0.000<0.05$). Since the probability of the chi-square is less than 0.05 critical value, the study rejects the null hypothesis. We can infer that poor implementation of the ECOWAS protocol on free movement constitutes a security threat to Nigeria. The result presented in Table 1.4.16 is used in testing for the second hypothesis (H₀₂: ECOWAS protocol is a gateway for illegal migration into Nigeria).

Table 1.4.16: ECOWAS is a gateway for illegal migration into Nigeria

Chi-Square Value	233.520
Df	3
Asymp. Sig.	0.000

Source: Extractions from SPSS 23 Output

The result shows a chi-square value of 233.52 with a degree of freedom of 3 and a probability value of 0.000 ($P = 0.000 < 0.05$). Based on the result, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the ECOWAS protocol is a gateway for illegal migration into Nigeria. The result presented in Table 1.4.17 is used in testing for the third hypothesis (H₀₃: Lack of effective border security does not cause Trans-border banditry in Nigeria).

Table 1.4.17: Border Security Agents in Nigeria and Trans-border banditry in Nigeria

Chi-Square Value	220.940 ^a
Df	3
Asymp. Sig.	0.000

Source: Extractions from SPSS 23 Output

The result shows a chi-square value of 220.940 with a degree of freedom of 3 and a probability value of 0.000 (that is, $P = 0.000 < 0.05$). Since the probability of the chi-square is less than 0.05 critical value, the study rejects the null hypothesis. We can therefore infer that lack of effective border security causes trans-border banditry in Nigeria.

The result presented in Table 1.4.18 is used for testing the fourth hypothesis (H₀₄: Border Security Agents in Nigeria are not fighting against illegal arms trading).

Table 1.4.18: Border Security Agents in Nigeria and Fight against Illegal Arms Trading

Chi-Square Value	180.860
Df	3
Asymp. Sig.	0.000

Source: Extractions from SPSS 23 Output

The result in Table 1.4.18 shows a chi-square value of 180.860 with a degree of freedom of 3 and a probability value of 0.000 (that is, $P = 0.000 < 0.05$). Since the probability of the chi-square is less than 0.05 critical value, the study rejects the null hypothesis. We can therefore infer that border security agents in Nigeria are fighting against illegal arms trading.

The result presented in Table 1.4.19 is used in testing the fifth hypothesis (H_{05} : Weak governance and ineffectiveness of border security forces do not limit the eradication of trans-border banditry in Nigeria).

Table 1.4.19: Weak Governance and Ineffectiveness of Border Security Forces Limiting the Eradication of Trans-border Banditry in Nigeria

Chi-Square Value	172.820
Df	3
Asymp. Sig.	0.000

Source: Extractions from SPSS 23 Output

The result in Table 1.4.19 shows a chi-square value of 172.820 with a degree of freedom of 3 and a probability value of 0.000 (that is, $P = 0.000 < 0.05$). Since the probability of the chi-square is less than 0.05 critical value, the study rejects the null hypothesis. The study, therefore, concludes that weak governance and ineffectiveness of border security forces limit the eradication of trans-border banditry in Nigeria.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Based on the qualitative data derived from the questionnaires, the result has revealed that there is a nexus between the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement, trans-border, and banditry in Nigeria. Consequently, Citizens of the Community particularly those from the Niger Republic have taken advantage of the implementation of the Protocol to engage in trans-border criminalities such as arms trafficking and banditry that continue to undermine Nigeria's national security. Also, the literature revealed that the formation of ECOWAS and enactment of protocol on the free movement of persons have helped to re-create borderless West Africa which existed before the advent of colonial rule. Although the flow of population has increased considerably within the past three and half decades the protocol has been in existence, there are problems and challenges to the realization of free movement of persons within the sub-region. These include strict border checks, unstable economies of many member states, delay in implementation of policies toward integration, and lack of focus due to multiple memberships in international organizations.

ECOWAS as an organization stands a better chance in harmonizing migration policies among member states by playing the lead role to fund and implement findings on migration studies. The most critical areas include institutional and policy reforms, tackling illegal cross-border trade, promoting the involvement of migration networks in decision-making at all levels, and taking bold steps to minimize child and human trafficking at large. This is a gap because globalization and the changing nature of migration which commenced many years ago have led to some convergence among states within the sub-region to cooperate to improve the movement of people.

Poor implementation of the Protocol by Nigerian border security agencies is responsible for the trans-border criminalities such as banditry. Thus, since security is strategic and fundamental to the safety of lives and property of any state, the porous nature of the Nigeria-Niger border is a weakness on the part of the Nigerian state. Therefore, the provisions of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment does not stop

Nigerian border security agencies to demand travel documents as contained in Article 2,3, and 5 of the Protocol. Equally, no provision in the Protocol prevents Nigerian border managers to register citizens of the community residing in Nigeria.

Finally, the Nigerian constitution stated clearly in chapter II that the primary responsibility of the Nigerian government is the protection of lives and property of citizens within its territorial jurisdiction, therefore, considering de-ratification from the implementation of the Protocol is imperative for Nigeria to effectively secure its frontiers.

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