

STATE VULNERABILITY AND THE ESCALATION OF THE LAKUWA THREAT IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the rapid rise of Lakurawa, a terrorist group that emerged in the early 2000s in Kebbi and Sokoto States and has since evolved into a dangerous transnational threat across Northwestern and North-Central Nigeria. Drawing on a qualitative analysis of security reports, military updates, and academic literature, the study mapped out the group's expansion and operational strategies. The findings revealed that Lakurawa capitalized on weak border security, poor local intelligence, and the political instability of the 2023 Niger Republic coup for its territorial expansion. These vulnerabilities allowed the group to transform from a localized militia into a sophisticated network spanning at least seven Nigerian states, including Zamfara, Niger, Kaduna, Kogi, and Kwara. Rather than relying solely on violence, Lakurawa functions as a shadow government: it enforces strict socio-religious rules, extracts forced taxes, and deploys "soft conquests" by purchasing local land at inflated prices. The group's recruitment thrives on porous borders, weak state presence, and the economic desperation of rural youth. To counter this threat, the paper recommends shifting from a reactive defence to a proactive strategy. Key proposals include deploying agile, forest-ready military units, launching drone surveillance along border corridors, and making substantial investments in mechanized agriculture to offer rural youth viable economic alternatives to insurgency.

Keywords: Lakurawa, transnational threat, shadow governance, border security, terrorist group

1. Introduction

1.1 Background to the Study

In the contemporary global security landscape, the proliferation of violent non-state armed groups (VNSAGs) has fundamentally altered the paradigm of state sovereignty and asymmetric warfare. Globally, transnational terrorist networks like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have shifted from centralized command hierarchies to decentralized, highly adaptive franchise models. These global networks weaponize institutional vacuums, severe economic inequality, and weak

state authority to establish illicit shadow economies and competitive governance structures that challenge traditional Westphalian borders.

Within Africa, this global phenomenon manifests acutely across the Sahel region. The convergence of climate migration, porous borders, and weak institutional capacity has transformed the Sahelian corridor, stretching from Mali and Burkina Faso to Niger, into the world's most active theatre for jihadist expansion (BusinessDay Editorial, 2014). Transnational coalitions, such as Jama'at

Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS) have successfully exploited political coups and the collapse of regional military cooperation to carve out autonomous enclaves, turning localized grievances into regional insurgencies.

At the base of this regional crisis, Nigeria stands as a critical geopolitical focal point; historically besieged by the Jama'atu Ahlis-sunnah, also known as Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) insurgencies in its northeastern theatre, the country now faces a dangerous diffusion of this extremist threat into its volatile Northwest and North-Central sub-regions. This internal shift has introduced a complex security architecture characterized by multi-factional turf wars between hybrid bandit networks, established jihadist cells, and newly emerging foreign extremist elements, the Lakurawa terror group.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Since 2017 when the Lakurawa terror group emerged in some northwest states like Sokoto and Kebbi, security have repeatedly engaged them and pushed them out of the Nigerian border. Despite repeated military engagements and tactical dispersals, the Lakurawa have not only re-emerged but have regrouped and expanded their operational footprint from two states (Sokoto and Kebbi) to at least seven states, including Zamfara, Niger, Kaduna, Kogi, and Kwara, as reported by many Nigerian dailies. The Lakurawa's resurgence is not a spontaneous eruption of violence; it is a gradual and calculated expansion enabled by three interlocking factors. First, the catastrophic collapse of cross-border intelligence cooperation and joint boundary patrols following the 2023 Niger coup d'état created an institutional security vacuum, allowing Sahelian jihadist elements to move through porous frontier corridors unobstructed, as described by the International Crisis Group (ICG, 2024).

Second, the group heavily capitalizes on the acute economic desperation of rural youth, exploiting widespread poverty and hunger through highly attractive material inducements, financial packages, and agricultural inputs (Bukarti, 2024; Moyi, 2024). Third, a persistently reactive and episodic security posture by the state fails to mitigate the core structural vulnerabilities of peripheral frontier communities (Rufa'i, 2024; Moyi, 2024).

The core problem remains that formal state security responses are heavily delayed, tactical, and localized. Conversely, the Lakurawa operate with deliberate strategic and systemic precision (Mohammed et al., 2025). They secure logistics hubs via high-value land and house buyouts, institutionalize aggressive parallel governance structures, and steadily integrate themselves into the broader Sahelian terrorist ecosystem (Barnett & Musa, 2026; Hotoro, 2026). Without a comprehensive and preventive understanding of this asymmetric dynamic, Nigeria risks the permanent consolidation of a de facto extremist caliphate within its sovereign borders (Moyi, 2021; Rufa'i, 2024).

This study addresses a critical gap in contemporary security literature, which heavily focuses on traditional guerrilla insurgencies like Boko Haram and ISWAP in Northeast Nigeria while under-theorizing the specific operational mechanisms and soft-conquest strategies deployed by the Lakurawa group in the Northwest and North-Central regions. Conventional scholarship largely views jihadist expansion through the lens of violent territory-grabbing, leaving an analytical vacuum regarding Lakurawa's non-violent, socio-economic infiltration tactics. Specifically, existing literature fails to capture how the group peacefully enters vulnerable frontier communities to systematically buy out vast tracts of land, farms, and residential properties at ten times their market value to establish

permanent logistical hubs without firing a single shot, as in the case of Kagara, Niger State (Hotoro, 2026; Ohamadike TV, 2026).

Furthermore, previous policy analyses treat the group as an episodic, trans-border pastoral nuisance, overlooking their rapid transition into a shadow bureaucratic state that enforces parallel governance and complex economic extraction (Barnett et al., 2022). This study bridges that gap by synthesizing regional Sahelian geopolitical shifts such as the 2023 Niger coup with local micro-level indicators of state fragility. It provides a unified framework that analyzes how the collapse of international border cooperation combines with severe rural poverty to turn starving local youth into a prime recruitment stream, while documenting the group's efforts to systematically dismantle traditional authority, implement alternative judicial courts, and enforce an alien commercial and socio-religious order (Ohamadike TV, 2026)

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The following objectives guide this paper:

1. To trace the historical evolution of the Lakurawa group in Nigeria.
2. To analyze the tactical and strategic mechanisms of their geographical expansion, particularly the soft-conquest model employed in Kagara, Niger State.
3. To examine the group's ideological affiliations with transnational terrorist networks
4. To assess the modes of governance established by the group in their areas of operation.
5. To evaluate the structural vulnerabilities that facilitates their growth.

1.4 Scope and Structure of the Paper

This study is geographically scoped to the Northwestern and North-Central states of

Nigeria, with specific focus on Sokoto, Kebbi, Zamfara, Niger, Kaduna, Kogi, and Kwara. Temporally, it spans from the early 2000s to December 2024, capturing the group's genesis, expulsion, and post-2021 resurgence, culminating in the recent clashes in Kagara, Niger State. The paper is structured as follows: Following this introduction, a comprehensive Literature Review situates the Lakurawa within existing scholarship on Sahelian terrorism and Nigerian insurgencies. The Theoretical Framework employs State Fragility Theory and Grievance Theory to explain the group's success. The Methodology section outlines the qualitative desk-based approach. The core narrative is then presented across historical, tactical, and governance dimensions. The paper concludes with policy recommendations derived from the analysis.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Academic Overemphasis on the Northeast and the Emerging Northwest Vacuum

The academic and policy literature on non-state armed groups in Nigeria has historically been dominated by studies on the Boko Haram insurgency and the ISWAP franchise in the Northeast region (ICG, 2024; Thurston, 2018). More recently, scholarship has pivoted toward examining the socioeconomic drivers of rural banditry and seasonal criminal networks in the Northwest and North-Central zones. However, the strategic emergence, territorial entrenchment, and rapid expansion of the Lakurawa group in the Northwest have prompted a growing, though still nascent, body of scholarly inquiry (Agbibo, 2021).

Initial operational profiles trace the etymology of the name "Lakurawa" to the French term *les recrues* or *le recrutement*, directly reflecting the group's foundational blueprint as a transnational recruitment network spanning the Sahelian corridor (Bukarti, 2024). Crucially, early literature

documents a catastrophic local intelligence failure in 2018, when Nigerian state authorities officially dismissed the group as peaceful pastoral herders who had migrated southward solely in search of water and grazing land. This structural misclassification provided Lakurawa with the political and operational camouflage necessary to map frontier terrains, exploit local farmer-herder grievances, and build initial trust networks among disenfranchised borderland populations without state interference. Linguistic and sociological analyses further reveal that the group maintains a distinct foreign core, characterized by an Arabic, French, and Fulfulde-speaking leadership that relies heavily on localized Hausa interpreters to engage and embed within northwestern host communities (Bukarti, 2024).

2.2 The Crime-Terror Nexus and Transnational Sahelian Alliances

Expanding on the group's external linkages, empirical security assessments have firmly established a complex crime-terror hybrid model connecting Lakurawa to prominent Sahelian extremist networks. Recent studies by Good Governance Africa (GGA, 2026; Lucia, 2026) reveal that the group's historical lineage traces back to Al-Qaeda recruitment pipelines in Mali around 2011–2012, with fighters later migrating into northern Nigeria (GGA, 2026). Rather than operating as an isolated localized militia, Lakurawa maintains functional operational and ideological alignments with JNIM and the ISGS.

Scholars emphasize that Lakurawa actively rejects the Boko Haram label, preferring instead to frame their operations as a disciplined theological *Jihad*, frequently self-identifying as *Mujahideen* or aligning operationally with Ansaru, the Al-Qaeda affiliate anchored in the Birnin-Gwari forests of Kaduna State. According to a landmark study by Barnett and Musa (2026), published through the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, this ideological divergence is highly

critical; it signals a deliberate southward penetration strategy designed to link Sahelian jihadist logistics with Nigeria's domestic criminal markets. By positioning themselves as an elite, ideologically pure alternative to unsophisticated local bandits, Lakurawa serves as a dangerous conduit connecting regional Sahelian cell networks to internal Nigerian spaces.

2.3 State Fragility, Boundary Porosity, and Tactical Governance Innovations

Broader literature examining the regional security-development nexus highlights how structural state fragility within Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger directly correlates with the escalation of internal insecurity in Northern Nigeria. Geopolitical analyses confirm that the collapse of joint border-security mechanisms and bilateral intelligence-sharing, exacerbated significantly by the 2023 Niger coup d'état, acted as a force multiplier for the group. As The Soufan Center notes, the resulting "ungoverned spaces" along the porous Niger-Nigeria borderlands have allowed criminal-terrorist hybrids to escape bilateral military crackdowns and establish permanent physical infrastructure (Mohammed et al. 2025; Soufan Center, 2026)

However, a glaring gap remains within existing literature regarding the group's highly sophisticated *modus operandi*. Conventional counterinsurgency scholarship heavily under-theorizes Lakurawa's unique tactical innovations, such as their economic "soft-conquest" model. Instead of initiating violent, high-casualty frontal assaults that trigger immediate military reprisal, the group leverages vast financial capital to execute strategic real estate and land buyouts at ten times the baseline market value (Soufan Center, 2026). This allows them to seamlessly secure durable logistical hubs and forward-operating enclaves within areas like Kagara and Borgu axis (Niger State) without firing a single shot (Hotoro, 2026; Soufan Center, 2026). This study

directly addresses this theoretical and empirical gap by synthesizing macro-level Sahelian border dynamics with micro-level tactical land acquisitions, providing a holistic and proactive threat assessment framework (Ogele, 2025).

3. Theoretical Framework

To adequately explain the Lakurawa's successful entrenchment and expansion, this paper employs a dual theoretical lens: "State fragility theory" and "greed versus grievance theory". State fragility theory (Rotberg, 2004) posits that state failure, specifically the inability of a state to provide core public goods such as security, justice, and economic infrastructure, creates a vacuum that non-state actors readily fill. In the context of Nigeria's Northwest, the state's failure to secure the vast and porous border with Niger, its inability to provide rural infrastructure (water, roads, electricity), and its deficient justice system have collectively legitimized the Lakurawa's alternative governance structures (Barnett et al., 2022; Sahara Reporters, 2026). The group does not merely exploit fragility; they actively mirror state functions, resolving disputes, collecting taxes (Zakat), and enforcing social codes, effectively positioning itself as a parallel sovereign government. As Rufa'i (2024) stated, it was the failure of the state to provide security to its citizens (especially due to the activities of bandits from Zamfara State that used to attack communities in Kebbi State) that made those communities employ the service of Lakurawa from far-away Mali.

Complementing this is "grievance, or relative deprivation theory" (Gurr, 1970), which argues that relative deprivation, the gap between what people expect and what they actually receive, drives collective violence. The Lakurawa's recruitment strategy explicitly targets this grievance. As Bukarti (2024) noted, "many youths joined the group because of hunger." The group offers immediate, tangible relief:

cash, farm inputs and implements such as seeds and planting material, pesticides and herbicides, pumping machines, and boreholes for irrigation. In communities where the state has delivered neither security nor prosperity, the Lakurawa's material inducements function as a compelling counter-narrative. Together, these theories explain both the supply of recruits (grievance) and the enabling environment (state fragility) that sustains the group.

4. Methodology

This study adopts a qualitative, desk-based research design that triangulates academic literature, institutional threat assessments, and an unpublished field manuscript to safely study the inaccessible Lakurawa enclaves. High-quality data were retrieved from databases such as Google Scholar, Scopus, ResearchGate, and Zenodo using targeted Boolean strings, alongside reports from international organizations such as Good Governance Africa (GGA), ICG, the Soufan Center, and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Strict inclusion criteria restricted the sample to English-language, peer-reviewed literature and official communiqués published between 2014 and 2026 that focus on Lakurawa's techniques in Northwest and North-Central Nigeria. Sources published before 2013, non-peer-reviewed materials, and isolated Northeast insurgency studies were systematically excluded. The compiled dataset was analyzed using Braun and Clarke's (2006) six-phase thematic framework to identify recurring qualitative patterns. The finalized findings were synthesized into four core analytical themes: historical genesis, operational and spatial tactics, governance imposition, and structural state vulnerabilities.

5. Findings and Discussion

The findings are organized into six thematic subsections as elaborated below;

5.1 Historical Evolution of the Lakurawa Group in Nigeria

The historical emergence and contemporary expansion of the Lakurawa within Nigeria illuminate a critical case of intelligence misclassification, local elite desperation, and the complex crime-terror nexus characterizing the modern Sahelian security architecture. Far from a spontaneous domestic uprising, the genesis of the group is deeply rooted in trans-Saharan migration patterns and structural state fragility (Barnett et al., 2022). When the group first infiltrated the remote borderland communities of Kebbi and Sokoto states in the early 2000s, they successfully leveraged historical pastoral and transhumance networks, operating under the deceptive guise of unassuming itinerant clerics and traditional herders (Rufa'i, 2024). Early indicators raised by rural populations in Gudu and Tangaza Local Government Areas (LGAs) regarding the presence of armed, multi-ethnic foreigners speaking Arabic, French, and Fulfulde were met with systemic failures of state intelligence. Instead of initiating early counter-containment protocols, state security forces issued a shortsighted investigative report in 2018 that officially exonerated the group, dismissing them as peaceful Fulani herders migrating solely due to environmental pressures and seasonal water availability (Bukarti & Musa, 2024; Rufa'i, 2024). This institutional blind spot provided the group with a crucial operational window to quietly map local topography, cultivate intelligence ties, and identify vulnerable rural youth without state interference.

Analytically, the expansion of the Lakurawa is anchored in a complex transnational pedigree that directly links internal Nigerian vulnerabilities with broader Sahelian jihadist movements. Composed of a militant core of Tuaregs, Berbers, and Fulani fighters from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the group's leadership, led by figures like Ahmadu

Kofa, tactically claims genealogical and educational ties to the historical Kebbi Empire to build local legitimacy (Rufa'i, 2024). This perceived legitimacy was heavily weaponized in 2017 when local traditional leaders in Sokoto, overwhelmed by violent incursions from Zamfara-based criminal bandits, made the fatal strategic choice to formally contract the Lakurawa as a community defense force. Funded by local cash contributions, livestock donations, and logistical support, the group rapidly transformed from hired community guards into an autonomous, deeply entrenched occupier. Ideologically, empirical security evaluations confirm that the Lakurawa are not isolated bandits but are functionally and logistically aligned with Al-Qaeda franchises, specifically the JNIM coalition and the ISGS (Delanga, et al., 2026). By actively rejecting the localized, Lake Chad-centric Boko Haram framework, they self-identify as Mujahideen, forging ideological and territorial bridges with Ansaru factions in the Birnin-Gwari forests of Kaduna State to establish a contiguous transnational corridor (Barnett & Musa, 2022).

5.2 Tactical and Strategic Mechanisms of their Geographical Expansion

The group's operational route illustrates the recurring nature of asymmetric warfare when state interventions remain purely reactive and tactical. In late 2018, the Lakurawa's shift toward overt violence, culminating in the execution of the District Head of Tangaza over a financial extortion dispute, triggered a rare, coordinated joint military offensive by Nigerian and Nigerien armed forces (Rufa'i, 2024). While this operation successfully dislodged the group and scattered its remnants back into the Sahelian deserts, it ultimately proved to be a superficial victory. The Nigerian state failed to establish permanent forward operating bases, secure the porous border corridors, or invest in peripheral infrastructure.

Consequently, the catastrophic collapse of cross-border intelligence-sharing and joint boundary patrols following the 2023 Niger coup d'état provided the group with an unprecedented strategic windfall. Benefiting from the regional security vacuum, the Lakurawa executed massive post-2023 resurgence, expanding their active operational footprint from their traditional strongholds into at least ten local government areas across Sokoto and Kebbi, including recent structural penetrations into Bunza LGA (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2025).

This geographic expansion has led to the systematic implementation of a highly competitive "state-within-a-state" governance model that indirectly challenges Nigerian sovereignty. The group has progressively eroded formal state authority by forbidding traditional rulers and statutory bodies from arbitrating communal affairs, establishing alternative judicial panels that dictate local codes (Truth Nigeria, 2026). This aggressive governance model enforces a strict, unfamiliar interpretation of socio-religious law that functions outside the established statutory Shari'ah frameworks of northern Nigeria, using violent coercion to enforce early marriages, censor local cultural expression, and systematically seize rural livestock assets under the guise of religious taxation (Zakat). The scale of this territorial dominance is so extensive that peripheral rural areas surrounding local government headquarters have fallen under their direct administrative influence, highlighting a qualitative shift from an episodic border threat to a permanent, systemic insurgency that threatens national security (ICG, 2024).

The strategic transition of the Lakurawa from localized mercenaries into an aggressive transnational insurgency underscores a highly calculated and adaptive geographic diffusion model. Rather than depending entirely on

traditional, high-casualty forward assaults that invite immediate state counter-offensives, the group has pioneered a sophisticated economic "soft conquest" approach to anchor its logistics. This tactical innovation is most prominently visible in the Kagara axis of Niger State, where empirical field reports reveal that the network systematically infiltrates vulnerable rural communities by approaching local property owners and purchasing vast tracts of farmland and residential real estate at up to ten times the baseline market value (Hotoro, 2026; Soufan Center, 2026). Academic analyses from Good Governance Africa confirm that this predatory financial outbidding functions as a highly deliberate real estate deployment strategy (Samuel, 2026). By securing legal and structural ownership of land before deploying kinetic force, the Lakurawa successfully establish permanent logistics hubs, safe houses, and fortified enclaves deep within Nigeria's North-Central region while evading initial surveillance and counterterrorism triggers.

Once physical infrastructure is secured, the network transitions into a multi-tiered ideological and structural conquest that aggressively expands outward from its primary bases. Mapping data published by the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) illustrates that the group's operational architecture is highly structured, incorporating an internal division of labour that spans specialized foot soldiers, localized informants, doctrinal preachers, religious judges, and international arms traffickers (Ojo, 2025; Amos, 2026). To expand this footprint, the Lakurawa leverage massive cash capital to run sophisticated rural recruitment drives, offering immediate financial stipends ranging between 100,000 and 1,000,000 Nigerian Naira alongside critical modern agricultural implements like seeds, fertilizers, and water pumping machines to disenfranchised youth (Hotoro, 2026). Research from The Soufan Center

demonstrates that this localized economic leverage has allowed the group to rapidly expand its operational strength, growing from a nominal trans-border cell into an army of roughly 2,000 active militants under centralized operational commands (Soufan Center, 2026). This rapid expansion has pushed their influence far beyond their original enclaves in Sokoto and Kebbi, driving strategic territorial penetrations southeastward into the forest corridors of Zamfara, Kaduna, Kogi, and the tri-border belts of Kwara State (Truth Nigeria, 2025).

This aggressive territorial expansion has turned Nigeria's northwest and north-central zones into highly volatile, multi-factional battlefields, precipitating violent turf wars between rival non-state armed actors. Geopolitical assessments by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS, 2026) show that as the Lakurawa push into new territories, such as the Borgu and Mashegu LGAs of Niger State or the Gusau-Dansadau axis in Zamfara, they inevitably collide with entrenched criminal bandit networks and preexisting jihadist cells. These inter-factional clashes represent a fundamental struggle over territorial control, illicit trade routes, and competing extraction markets. The Lakurawa view non-ideological local bandits as undisciplined, secular criminals, systematically attempting to co-opt their top leadership or eliminate them when they resist absorption. Concurrently, intelligence briefs from the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point note a dangerous pattern of opportunistic convergence; while the Lakurawa clash fiercely with bandits over cattle-rustling routes, they also maintain ambiguous, transactional relations with Boko Haram splinters and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) units to run joint hostage camps and coordinate heavy arms trafficking (Barnett & Musa, 2026). This multi-layered warfare creates a highly complex security environment for the Nigerian

military, where localized kinetic operations are frequently complicated by shifting alliances among rival insurgent factions.

The structural catalyst sustaining this unchecked geographic diffusion remains the systemic vulnerability and extreme border porosity defining the Nigeria-Niger-Benin tri-border frontier. Official assessments from the ICG emphasize that the formal breakdown of bilateral intelligence-sharing, joint border security patrols, and regional military cooperation following the 2023 Niger coup effectively transformed these borderlands into unmonitored transit corridors. The Lakurawa skillfully exploit these institutional security gaps, utilizing a network of hundreds of illegal trans-boundary footpaths to move heavy weapons, foreign fighters, and contraband across national borders without detection. Combined with a security posture that remains reactive, rather than proactive forest interdiction, the state's inability to govern its peripheral spaces has allowed the Lakurawa to continuously regroup, rearm, and steadily build a dangerous proto-state within the sovereign boundaries of Nigeria (ICG, 2024).

6. Conclusion

The rapid expansion of the Lakurawa terror group from two northwestern states in 2024 to at least seven states across the Northwest and North-Central sub-regions is a critical national security menace that requires a whole-of-society and whole-of-government approach

The group's threat is not a passing storm; it is a harbinger of a permanent insurgency if left unchecked. Their transformation from peaceful herders to massacring district heads, from expelled outsiders to entrenched landowners and from a presence in two states to about seven states, particularly their dominance in Kagara, Niger State, demonstrates a

remarkable capacity for adaptation. The states of the Northwest and North-Central are vulnerable precisely because they are hollow: weak economies, absent infrastructure, unsecured borders, and unemployed youth populations.

Like Boko Haram, ISWAP and Bandits ('yan-ta'adda & 'yan-bindiga), the Lakurawa group is becoming a major threat to national security, which needs urgent attention before their activities engulf the whole country. To reverse this menace, the following recommendations are proffered:

7. Recommendations

Based on the findings, the following recommendations emerge:

1. From Reactive to Proactive Security Approach: The military must take the fight to the criminals' enclaves using agile light vehicles and motorbikes capable of navigating forested terrain, rather than waiting to repel attacks. Armed Forest Guards, Border Guards and Mining Marshals must be equipped with modern surveillance devices to monitor these vast, ungoverned spaces.

2. Massive Rural Investment: To take our youth off the street, the government must confront the recruitment pipeline by building basic infrastructure, including water, electricity, roads, and telecommunications, to revive rural economies, and transform subsistence farming into commercial, mechanized production.

3. Technological Deployment: Drones, UAVs, and video surveillance cameras must become standard tools for border surveillance, providing real-time intelligence.

4. Enhancing Domestic Cooperation: Need to enhance domestic cooperation among neighbouring states and inter-agency communication and

information/intelligence sharing among relevant stakeholders.

5. Rebuilding International Cooperation: To block the trans-border movement of illicit goods and services, bearer negotiable instruments, weapons and foreign terrorists, there is a need for the federal government to enhance international cooperation with neighbouring countries like Niger, Benin, Chad and Cameroon.

6. Justice System Reform and Moral Re-armament: The state must address the perception of marginalization and promote community-led programs to inoculate youth against extremist narratives.

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