

## AN EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF INSURGENCY ON VOTER REGISTRATION IN BORNO STATE, NIGERIA (2015–2023)

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### Abstract

*Voter registration is the foundational gateway to the electoral process, yet it is severely disrupted by persistent insurgent activities in the North-East, particularly in Borno State. This study evaluates the impact of insurgency on voter registration in Borno State, Nigeria, between 2015 and 2023. Anchored on the frustration-aggression theory, the study employs a mixed-methods design combining a survey of 377 respondents with Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) across six local government areas. The study showed that insurgency significantly suppressed potential voter turnout for registration, destroyed electoral materials and INEC registration centers, and displaced prospective registrants from their natural abode. Findings revealed that fear of attacks by insurgents and mass displacements of potential registrants were the major factors that hindered voter registration in Borno State. Findings further revealed that the Nigerian military secured many locations and facilitated higher voter registration rates across Borno State, yet several prospective voters remained unregistered or unable to collect PVCs especially in some rural communities due to fear of insurgent attacks, displacement, physical and psychological trauma among others. The study concludes that insurgency significantly impacted voter registration in Borno State, leading to exclusion of several prospective voters. The study recommends intensive community-based voter education campaign, integrated civil-military cooperation strategies, mobile and online registration for prospective voters to prevent physical attacks from the insurgents and enhanced security coordination and collaboration through Inter-Agency Consultative Committee on Election Security (ICCES) to safeguard voter registration in Borno State.*

**Keywords:** Insurgency, Voter Registration, Electoral Security, Borno State, Conflict

### 1.1 Introduction

Elections are a central mechanism for democratic representation and political legitimacy. However, the credibility of elections depends heavily on the effective conduct of electoral preparatory processes, with voter registration being the most fundamental. Voter registration determines the composition of the electorate, shapes electoral outcomes, and guarantees the principle of universal suffrage. In many democratic nations, including the United

States of America, Britain, France, and India, voter registration is the bedrock of credible elections as it confers primary legitimacy on the electorate to vote for preferred candidates in electoral contests. Despite its relevance as a foundational gateway for credible elections, voter registration exercise faces different types of violence, including those caused by acts of insurgency.

Many African countries have experienced the scuttling of the registration exercise along with other phases of the electoral

process by insurgency and other criminal acts. Beyond cases of large-scale killings, which often create widespread fear of insecurity for potential registrants to come out for registration exercise, a more common violent scenario has been the destruction of registration materials and intimidation of registration officers of impending troubles if they opt to register people, especially in the areas infested by insurgent groups as witnessed in many African countries, including Nigeria, Kenya and Somalia. Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed several cases where armed conflict undermined electoral processes, including in the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and Mali.

In Nigeria, the 2011 general elections were postponed from 9 to 16 April 2011 due to insecurity, while many prospective voters could not register because of the state of insecurity at the registration centres in North-eastern Nigeria (Onuoha, 2026). The Boko Haram insurgency has had profound implications for democratic consolidation, particularly in the North-East geopolitical zone. Beyond cases of large-scale killings, which often create widespread fear of insecurity for potential registrants, a more common violent scenario has been the destruction of registration materials and intimidation of registration officers.

Since 2009, Borno State has experienced widespread destruction of public institutions, mass internal displacement, and targeted attacks on civilian and state actors. Between 2015 and 2023, INEC reported the suspension of Continuous Voter Registration, (CVR) in 9 Local Government Areas of Borno State due to insurgents' activities (INEC, 2019). Additionally, INEC relocated 29 registration centers and struggled to conduct voter education in frontline communities (INEC, 2023). The insurgency has disarticulated the architecture of voter registration, creating a crisis of democratic inclusion, even as

the military largely degrades the sect's capability.

Despite the centrality of voter registration as a fundamental mechanism for credible elections, existing literature on Nigerian elections has focused specifically on election-day violence, voter turnout, voter apathy, electoral violence and post-election litigation. There are limited empirical studies on how insurgency specifically impacted voter registration as a pre-election activity. This gap is critical because the disenfranchisement that occurs at the registration stage cannot be remedied on election day. It is against this background that this study seeks to evaluate the impact of insurgency on voter registration in Borno State, Nigeria, 2015–2023.

## 1.2 Statement of the Problem

The conduct of voter registration in Borno State between 2015 and 2023 occurred amidst persistent insurgency that displaced over 1.8 million persons. While the state has a constitutional obligation to ensure universal suffrage, the activities of Boko Haram have created a situation where potential registrants are unable to register or participate in elections. The destruction of registration centers, killing of INEC ad-hoc staff, and displacement of over 2 million people from their natural habitat have created barriers to registration, leading to the relocation of registration centers and the disenfranchisement of affected populations. The inability of many potential voters to register may deny them their voting rights in subsequent elections. Similarly, the fear of attacks discouraged eligible citizens from presenting themselves for registration, while displacement separated many prospective registrants from their original polling units.

While many studies have documented the general impact of Boko Haram on Nigerian elections, most studies have treated the registration phase as a mere

sub-component of the broader electoral cycle rather than as a distinct gateway to enfranchisement. There are many studies on the Boko Haram insurgency and electoral violence in Nigeria but none of the studies focused on how insurgency specifically affects voter registration in Borno State, a gap this study has filled.

### 1.3 Research Questions

This study answers the following research questions:

- i. What are the effects of Boko Haram insurgency on voters' turn-out for registration in Borno State between 2015 and 2023?
- ii. What are the factors responsible for disenfranchising prospective voters from registration in Borno State between 2015 and 2023?

### 1.4 Aim and Objectives of the Study

The aim of this study is to examine the implications of Boko Haram insurgency on voters' registration exercise in Borno State. The objectives of the study are to:

- i. To examine the effects of Boko Haram insurgency on voters' turn-out for registration exercise in Borno State between 2015 and 2023;
- ii. To assess the factors responsible for disenfranchising prospective voters from registration in Borno State between 2015 and 2023.

## 1.5 Literature Review

### 1.5.1 Concept of Insurgency

Insurgency refers to a violent move by a person or group of persons to resist or oppose the enforcement of lawful rules and regulation and a revolt against constituted authority of the state. Insurgency is a form of rebellion against an established authority, characterised by prolonged armed conflict and political objectives. It involves organised, armed groups that seek to challenge or overthrow

the existing political order through a combination of military operations, political mobilisation, and territorial control. According to Nigeria's National Counter Terrorism Strategy (2016 Revised, p1) insurgency means "an organized armed struggle by a group aimed at weakening the authority of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in order to force a political change through the propagation of extremist ideology, under the guise of politico-economic". According to Obafemi and Galadima (2013) insurgency is a strategy adopted by groups, which cannot attain their political objectives through conventional means, but by protracted, asymmetric violence, ambiguity, the use of complex terrain (jungles, mountains, and urban areas), psychological warfare, and political mobilization, it is fast becoming a means of expressing perceived discontents among groups in the country.

Kilcullen (2010) conceptualises insurgency as a strategy employed by non-state armed groups to assert political, military, and territorial control within a specific geographic space, often necessitating the incorporation of the civilian population to gain grassroots support. Hoffman (2006) corroborates this position by highlighting that insurgency accommodates variants of organised violence, including terrorism, militancy, and rebellion against state authority, particularly when such violence is directed at undermining state legitimacy. In a more comprehensive manner, Moore (undated) opines that an insurgency is a protracted violent conflict, in which one or more groups seek to overthrow or fundamentally change the political or social ordering in a state or region through the use of sustained violence, subversion, social disruption, and political action. He further maintains that insurgency seeks radical change to the existing political and social orders through the use of sustained violence and political disruption. It is a long-term form of

warfare in which military actions are carried out by guerilla attacks and terrorism often as one of its basic elements, targeting civilian infrastructures (Moore, undated).

In the Nigerian context, the Boko Haram insurgency exemplifies this conceptualisation, as the group has sought to establish an alternative governance structure in the North-East, particularly in Borno State, through sustained armed confrontation with state forces and the systematic targeting of state institutions, including electoral infrastructure (Adesote et al., 2024). The group's ability to mobilise local populations and challenge the state's monopoly of violence aligns with the classic attributes of insurgency, while its use of terrorist tactics such as suicide bombings and targeted assassinations illustrates the blurred boundaries between insurgency and terrorism in contemporary conflict environments. An obvious feature of insurgency is the widespread loss of life, in which casualties are frequently most vulnerable, such as women, children (who are often recruited as fighters) and the elderly. This is because cities and urban areas, which generally have large civilian populations, are strategically important locations for insurgent operations, and hence control over these is often strongly contested.

### 1.5.2 Concept of Voter Registration

Voter registration is the process by which eligible citizens are enrolled into the official register of voters, thereby conferring on them the legal right to participate in elections. It is a pre-election activity that determines the size and composition of the electorate and serves as a gatekeeper to democratic participation. International IDEA (2014) notes that voter registration is not merely an administrative exercise but a political process that shapes electoral outcomes and guarantees universal suffrage. In conflict-affected

settings, however, voter registration becomes particularly vulnerable because it requires physical presence, stable infrastructure, and citizen trust in state institutions—conditions that are often eroded by insurgency (Norris, 2014).

The centrality of voter registration to electoral integrity implies that any disruption at this stage produces compounding effects throughout the electoral cycle. When registration centers are destroyed, biometric devices are vandalised, or prospective registrants are displaced, the resultant exclusion cannot be corrected on election day. Consequently, understanding voter registration as a distinct phase of the electoral process, rather than a mere administrative prelude, is essential for assessing the impact of insurgency on democratic inclusion.

### 1.5.3 Boko Haram Insurgency and the Electoral Process in Nigeria

Boko Haram increased the tempo of insurgency in the early part of 2015, which was an election year, while also putting the electoral process in the North-east under serious security threat by destroying critical infrastructural facilities including INEC offices, registration materials and voters' registration centres in North-eastern Nigeria. Thomas (2016) observed that the escalating violence of the Boko Haram sect has been focused on scuttling Nigeria's electoral process, by targeting state institutions and attacking critical government symbols especially in the North-East. Ademola (2018) identifies reasons why the insurgents always find it easy to disrupt the electoral process, especially during election years, adducing the reasons to the fact that political elites are often distracted and pre-occupied with how to win elections by spending much time on meetings and campaigns with little time dedicated to mapping out strategies to end the insurgency. Such corporate negligence of constitutional responsibility

gives the insurgents ample opportunities to wreak havoc.

In addition, Ademola (2018) finds that many political opponents often wish that the government in power did not win the insurgency war so that they can use the challenge as an implication of the inability of the government to provide security, thereby voting the incumbent out of power. Onuoha (2026) profiles non-state armed groups and posits that their motivations, presence and operations increased the risk of violence and insecurity during election days, with particular implications for voter registration and turnout in affected states. These studies collectively establish that Boko Haram has targeted the electoral process as a strategic objective.

Recent empirical analyses have reinforced these observations. Adesote et al. (2024) historicise the Boko Haram insurgency in North-East Nigeria and demonstrate how the group's sustained attacks on state institutions have undermined governance and electoral administration. Ikeanyibe et al. (2023) evaluate interagency collaboration in counterinsurgency campaigns and note that fragmented security responses have allowed insurgents to continue attacking electoral infrastructure. Moreover, the International Crisis Group (2023) warned that the 2023 elections in Nigeria faced elevated risks of violence, particularly in the North-East, where insurgent activities threatened voter registration and turnout. These recent findings confirm that the intersection of insurgency and electoral administration remains a critical challenge for democratic consolidation in Nigeria.

#### **1.5.4 Voter Registration in Conflict-Affected Zones**

Olukayode (2019) observed that Boko Haram insurgency is a threat to voter registration exercise because not all voters have their cards yet in the North-east. Only 44 million out of 68.8 million registered

voters have received their cards because many of the areas are plagued by insurgency. Hassan (2019) posits that the destructive activities of the Boko Haram insurgency have negative implications for the electoral process and voter registration exercise in particular, as witnessed in the 2015 general elections where many IDPs in various camps could not vote despite having attained the voting age and having registered. UNHCR (2016) noted that many IDPs lost their permanent voter cards (PVCs) in an attempt to escape insurgency and were reportedly re-registered afresh in the camps where they were taking refuge, thus leading to the problem of multiple registrations.

However, in Borno State, a significant number of IDPs were unable to register, and those that either registered or reported the loss of their voter cards are yet to receive their permanent voter cards due to insurgent activities. Oni (2025) noted that from 2019 to 2023, criminals attacked INEC offices 50 times in fifteen states, systematically decapitating the commission from performing its constitutional role. The official voter turnout for the 2019 presidential election was 35.6% while that of the 2023 presidential and National Assembly elections was 26.7%, representing a disturbing decline. These studies confirm that registration and turnout are depressed by insecurity, but they rarely disaggregate registration from voting, or examine how the loss of PVCs in displacement creates a secondary wave of disenfranchisement.

Recent scholarship has provided more nuanced evidence. Van Baalen (2024), using data from Côte d'Ivoire, demonstrates that electoral violence is associated with significantly lower voter turnout in districts where incumbent strength is contested, a pattern that mirrors the Nigerian experience. Adewara et al. (2025) examine the 2023 general elections and find that physical violence and psychological fear largely influenced voter

participation in Nigeria's South-West and South-East, underscoring the national scope of insecurity-driven electoral exclusion. In the specific context of Borno State, the Norwegian Refugee Council (2022) reported that insurgents' activities and the inability of IDPs to register from their natural abode were the primary drivers of voter exclusion during the 2015, 2019, and 2023 election cycles.

### 1.6 Theoretical Framework

This study is anchored on Frustration-Aggression Theory (Dollard et al., 1939). The Frustration-Aggression Theory was proposed in 1939 by psychiatrist John Dollard and his colleagues. The hypothesis holds that the occurrence of aggressive behaviour always presupposes the existence of frustration and that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression (Dollard et al., 1939). Frustration-Aggression Theory explains that blocked goals and state failure generate frustration which is displaced as aggression against state institutions (Berkowitz, 1989). The theory explains why the insurgents target registration infrastructure: the electoral system symbolises the liberal democratic order they seek to dismantle. However, the theory has been criticized for not adequately explaining why some frustrated groups resort to violence while others do not (Crenshaw, 2000; Loimeier, 2012; Olanrewaju, 2018; Raji, 2021). For the purpose of this study, however, the theory remains significant because it explains the emotional and ideological drivers behind insurgent attacks. Therefore, the theory provides a comprehensive framework for understanding how insurgency erodes registration from both the supply side (state capacity to administer registration)

and the demand side (citizen willingness to participate).

### 1.7 Research Methodology

This study adopted a mixed-methods research design using quantitative survey and qualitative techniques. The area of study is Borno State, which has 27 local government areas (NPC, 2006). The population comprised 2,513,281 registered voters in Borno State as of 2023 (INEC, 2023). The primary data was sourced through the administration of questionnaires while secondary data was sourced from relevant agencies of government, online materials, textbooks, journals, unpublished lecture notes and seminar. Taro Yamane formula for determining sample size was used and produced a sample of 400 respondents. A total number of four hundred (400) questionnaires were purposively administered to the respondents, out of which three hundred and seventy-seven (377) valid responses were analysed descriptively. Using purposive sampling techniques, six local government areas were selected which include Gwoza, Bama, Marte, Maiduguri, Jere, Biu. Key Informant Interview (KII) were conducted with stakeholders consisting community members, journalists, aid workers, civil servants, security personnel, INEC staff, civil society organisations. Details in the research instrument were categorized in two sections. Section A covers socio-economic details of respondent and section B covers the main research questions. Copies of the questionnaires were carefully administered, retrieved and analyzed using descriptive statistics, frequencies and simple percentages, while the qualitative data were analysed using content analysis.

### 1.8 Data Analysis

**Table 1:** Distribution of Response Rate through Questionnaires

| Questionnaires           | Frequency | Percentage |
|--------------------------|-----------|------------|
| Returned questionnaire   | 377       | 94.3%      |
| Unreturned questionnaire | 23        | 5.7%       |
| Total                    | 400       | 100.0%     |

*Source: Researcher's Survey, 2026.*

Table 1 shows that 377 (94.3%) of the total 400 questionnaires were retrieved while 23 (5.7%) were not returned, indicating a very high response rate suitable for reliable analysis. The high

retrieval rate is particularly significant given the challenges of administering questionnaires in conflict-affected LGAs.

#### **Section 1:** Socio-Demographic Information of Respondents

**Table 2:** Distribution of Respondents by Age, Occupation, and Sex

| Variable   | Category              | Frequency | Percentage |
|------------|-----------------------|-----------|------------|
| Age        | 18 – 29               | 112       | 29.7%      |
|            | 30 – 39               | 142       | 37.7%      |
|            | 40 – 49               | 91        | 24.1%      |
|            | 50 – 59               | 24        | 6.4%       |
|            | 60 and above          | 8         | 2.1%       |
|            | Sub-total             | 377       | 100.0%     |
| Occupation | Civil/public servants | 80        | 21.2%      |
|            | Community members     | 101       | 26.8%      |
|            | Politicians           | 70        | 18.6%      |
|            | INEC staff            | 58        | 15.4%      |
|            | Businessmen           | 33        | 8.8%       |
|            | Students              | 35        | 9.2%       |
|            | Sub-total             | 377       | 100.0%     |
| Sex        | Male                  | 271       | 71.9%      |
|            | Female                | 106       | 28.1%      |
|            | Sub-total             | 377       | 100.0%     |

*Source: Researcher's survey, 2026.*

Table 2 shows that the 18–29 years group which falls within active voting age, account for 112 respondents (29.7%), while 30–39 years category which also

falls within active voting age account for 142 respondents (37.7%), representing the highest number of respondents in the study. The 40–49 years group constituted

91 respondents (24.1%), representing mature adults with considerable political experience. The 50–59 years category accounted for 24 respondents (6.4%), while only 8 respondents (2.1%) were aged 60 years and above, indicating limited participation of elderly citizens, which may reflect mobility constraints in conflict-affected areas.

The civil/public servants account for 80 respondents (21.2%) while community members constituted the largest group with 101 respondents (26.8%), followed by politicians which accounted for 70 respondents (18.6%), while INEC staff comprised 58 respondents (15.4%). Businessmen and students represented smaller proportions at 33 (8.8%) and 35 (9.2%) respectively. This occupational

distribution indicates that respondents were drawn from categories positioned at the intersection of electoral administration and grassroots citizen experience, strengthening the validity of the findings.

In terms of sex distribution, males dominated the sample with 271 respondents (71.9%), while females accounted for 106 respondents (28.1%). The male predominance reflects constrained female mobility in conflict-affected Borno State, though the 28.1% female representation remains sufficient to capture gendered dimensions of registration exclusion.

**Question 1:** Effects of Boko Haram Insurgency on Voters' Turn-out for Registration

**Table 3:** Distribution of Respondents' Opinion on the Effects of Boko Haram Insurgency on Voters' Turn-out for Registration in Borno State

| Turn-out Level       | Frequency | Percentage |
|----------------------|-----------|------------|
| Very high            | 61        | 16.2%      |
| High                 | 70        | 18.6%      |
| Low                  | 135       | 35.8%      |
| Very low             | 73        | 19.4%      |
| High and Low (mixed) | 38        | 10.0%      |
| Total                | 377       | 100.0%     |

Source: Researcher's survey, 2026.

Table 3 shows that 61 respondents (16.2%) perceived voter turnout for registration as very high, while 70 respondents (18.6%) viewed it as high. Conversely, 135 respondents (35.8%) considered turnout to be low, and 73 respondents (19.4%) rated it as very low. Additionally, 38 respondents (10.0%) indicated mixed turnout across different areas. The preponderance of low turnout perception

(55.2% combined low and very low) aligns with national trends showing declining voter participation in conflict zones.

A respondent who is a retired security personnel member opined that:

*"In spite of the fact that the number of registered voters in 2019 stood at 2,315,956, registration of voters remains relatively low in some local government*

areas, both for the registration and collection of the PVCs, as a result of frequency of insurgents' attacks. Thus, out of the total number of 2,315,956 registered voters in Borno State in the 2019 general elections, 409,833 were registered within the IDP camps, with Maiduguri municipality registering 1,384,202 people. Interestingly, what the above data confirmed is that high voters' registrants in Borno State were recorded in Maiduguri, adjoining local governments and IDPs camps across the state where adequate security was provided to shield off the Boko Haram insurgents from scuttling the registration process." KII/Male/Registrant/IDP Camp Commandant/Gwoza/July, 2026.

Another respondent who is an INEC officer confirms that:

"The total number of registrants for the 2015 election was 1,407,777 while the total number of PVC collection was 789,567. The total registrants in 2019 in Borno State were 2,315,956, out of which 563,000 registrants collected their PVC. However, in spite of the relative improvement in registration of voters for the 2019 elections, over two million people in Borno State are still left out of the registration web. Interestingly, the total number of registrants for the 2023 election was 2,513,281 while the total number of PVC collection was 2,447,209. The sharp increase was as a result of improved technology and enhanced electoral security in the state." KII/Male/Electoral officer/Marte/July, 2026

**Question 2:** What are the factors responsible for disenfranchising prospective voters from registration in Borno State?

**Table 4:** Distribution of Respondent on the factors responsible for disenfranchising prospective voters from registration in Borno State

| Factors Responsible for disenfranchising prospective voters   | Frequency | Percentage |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|------------|
| Fear of attack by insurgents                                  | 114       | 30.2%      |
| Displacement of potential registrants from natural habitat    | 76        | 20.2%      |
| Destruction of PVCs and biometric devices by insurgents       | 69        | 18.3%      |
| Inadequate registration centers                               | 58        | 15.4%      |
| Insufficient voter education and INEC sensitization programme | 40        | 10.6%      |
| Curfews and restricted movement                               | 20        | 5.3%       |
| Total                                                         | 377       | 100.0%     |

Source: Researcher's survey, 2026.

In Table 4 above, it was revealed that majority of the respondents; 114 (30.2%)

were of the view that fear of attack by insurgents was responsible for

disenfranchising prospective voters from registration, while 76 (20.2%) of the respondents were of the view that displacement of potential registrants from natural habitat was responsible for disenfranchising prospective voters from registration. Meanwhile, 69 (18.3%) of the respondents were of the view that destruction of PVCs and biometric devices by insurgents were responsible for disenfranchising prospective voters from registration while 58 (15.4%) of the respondents were of the view that inadequate registration centers were responsible for disenfranchising prospective voters. In addition, 40 (10.6%) of the respondents were of the view that insufficient voter education and INEC sensitization programme were responsible for disenfranchising prospective voters while 20 (5.3%) were of the view that curfews and restricted movement were responsible for disenfranchising prospective voters.

While contributing to the factors capable of disenfranchising prospective voters from registration in Borno State, a traditional ruler posits that:

*"The fear of attacks by the insurgents scared away people from the registration exercise. For instance, in the year 2015, INEC suspended the Continuous Voters' Registration (CVR) in Marte and Gwoza due to frequent attacks by Boko Haram insurgents. There were also instances where voter registration officers were attacked and vital election materials damaged. The INEC at a point requested that the Nigerian Air Force assists in air lifting registration personnel and materials to a safer place as a result of attacks by the insurgents. This has resulted in denying many voters from participating in the voter registration in Borno State."* KII/Male/Community leader/Bama/July, 2026.

## 1.9 Discussion of Findings

i. Findings on objective one reveal that the preponderance of low turnout perception (55.2%) confirms that Boko Haram insurgency has structurally undermined the registration exercise and tampered with citizens' fundamental right to participate in the electoral process. This finding aligns with Burchard (2015) and Norris (2014) that insurgency suppresses political participation, leading to low voter turnout. It also resonates with van Baalen (2024), who demonstrates that electoral violence significantly depresses voter turnout in conflict-affected districts.

ii. Findings on objective two revealed that majority of the respondents agreed that fear of attack by insurgents (30.2%), followed by displacement of potential registrants from natural habitat (20.2%) were the major factors responsible for disenfranchising prospective voters from registration in Borno State. These findings are in consonance with NRC (2022), which reported that insurgents' activities and the inability of IDPs to register from their natural abode were the primary drivers of voter exclusion in Borno during the 2015, 2019, and 2023 election cycles.

## 1.10 Conclusion

This study concludes that insurgency undermined voter registration in Borno State. Although the Nigerian military secured many locations for potential voters, ensured large return of IDPs to their natural abode and facilitated higher voter registration rates in collaboration with other security agencies and INEC, electoral security still remains a central challenge. Therefore, the issue of electoral security is a central concern to prospective voters and could exclude many potential voters from voting in subsequent elections in Borno State, especially in the 2027 general elections.

### 1.11 Recommendations

Based on the findings of the study, the followings were recommended:

- i. To address the low voters' turn-out for registration, INEC should establish mega registration centres with adequate security and introduce online registration platforms to reduce the physical risks that deter prospective registrants in conflict-affected areas.
- ii. To safeguard the security of INEC umpires and registration materials, the Federal Government should increase security personnel and logistics, including helicopter distribution of electoral materials, in volatile LGAs, coordinated through the Inter-Agency Consultative Committee on Election Security (ICCES).
- iii. To mitigate the challenges of conducting voters' registration under Boko Haram insurgency, INEC should resume Continuous Voter Registration early, remove administrative barriers preventing IDPs from registering, deploy mobile units to IDP camps and conduct targeted voter outreach to ensure inclusion in the registration process.

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