

## THE EFFECT OF BOKO HARAM TERRORISM ON AGRICULTURE IN NIGERIA: A STUDY OF THE BORNO STATE SCENARIO (2017-2022)

**ALABI YUNUSA**

Department of Political Science, Nigerian Police Academy, Wudil, Kano State

[daurabra@gmail.com](mailto:daurabra@gmail.com),

+2348033944917

**AIDELOKHAI DENIS IDONIJE (PH. D)**

Department of Public Administration, Ibrahim Babangida University Lapai, Niger State

[aidelokhaidenis@gmail.com](mailto:aidelokhaidenis@gmail.com),

+23480357727725

**USMAN A. Y.**

National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), Kaduna State.

[conficidint@gmail.com](mailto:conficidint@gmail.com),

+2348165426303

### ABSTRACT

*This study investigates the effects of terrorism on agriculture in Nigeria, focusing on the Borno state scenario. Terrorist Activities in Borno State Since 2009 a group of Islamic radicals known as Boko Haram has become increasingly vehement in their actions. This set has been useful in the north-eastern Nigerian municipality of Borno since its inception in 2009. This research looks at the effects of terrorism on farming in Borno State. Agriculture in Borno state can be leisurely by utilizing four distinct parameters: the volume of the urbane area, annual crop production, livestock care, and fish farming. These are the most important agricultural sector in which the people of Borno are involved. However, due to the inability to obtain statistics, livestock rearing, and fish farming are released, focusing on the area cultivated as well as yearly crop production. Two replicas are advanced as a result of the outcome of these two variables. First, model procedures of the link between crop volumes and terrorist killings; the second model measures the link between entire areas of farmland cultivated and terrorist deaths. This study employs the Ordinary Least Squares methodology and discovers that mutual relationships expose undesirable results, thus representing statistically significant negative effects of terrorism on agricultural activities in Borno State shows that Boko Haram terrorism undoubtedly had a significant impact on agricultural activities in Borno State, and recommendations are given.*

**Keywords:** Boko Haram, Agricultural, Activities, Borno State, Nigeria

### I. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism first appeared in the country's Northeastern zone in 2009, when the Islamic group known as Boko Haram unleashed violence (ACSRT, 2020). Thurston (2016) and Granville (2020) Md Mostofa, (2019) Previously, the group, whose activities began in 2002, had used nonviolent means to spread the doctrine. However, in 2009, the set agitated against the government of Nigeria's directive to wear helmets, which was imposed order. The set's rejection sparked a clash between police officers and Boko Haram members, resulting in the deaths of approximately 700 Boko Haram members, including the Islamic sect's leader, Mohammed Yusuf (Jelilov et al. 2018; Ebonyi 2019; Manful 2019).

According to Ibrahim (2018) Boko Haram had a new leader by 2014, making the group more violent, with over 13,000 deaths caused by years of insurgency as well as counter-insurgency operations in the country's northern region since 2009. Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa are the most affected states, all of which are located in Nigeria's Northeastern zone. Boko Haram's strength increased in 2014, claiming the lives of approximately 7,711 people. The sect also claimed some towns in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states (Independent Advisory Group on Country Information 2021). Boko Haram controlled 40-70 percent of the state of Borno alone (Dunn 2018). Lingering violence in the Northeastern region has tormented the entire population of 24.5 million people in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, and Taraba states

(Insurgency 2014). Almost 1.9 million people have been expatriated, and an additional 4.8 million people are facing disaster, primarily food insecurity (ACAPS 2015).

The consequences of the disaster affect many sectors, including shelter, food, health, livelihoods, security, and education. Since the beginning of the insurgency, the main challenge to food security has been enormous. Uncertainty in marketplaces, farmers' inability to cultivate, and the high cost of transportation are the factors that contribute to food insecurity. Cereal bills in the northeastern zone markets remained 74% - 120% advanced in January 2017, compared to the previous two years' normal price equalization (Messages 2017). According to OCHA (2018) approximately 5.1 million people face food insecurity. Houses were demolished and many communities remained desolate as a result of farmers' inability to cultivate their land and persistent livestock theft. Scarcity frequency in the country's northeastern region increased from 47.3% in 2011 to 50.4% in 2013 (World Health Organization (WHO) 2020). Specifically, 2.3 million people require assistance to survive.(OCHA 2021).

The crisis has significantly reduced access to healthcare services; reasons include the absence of healthcare workers, and meager living conditions with millions of people held in camps, which has exacerbated undernourishment, For example, in February 2017, one-third of the 749 health facilities in Borno state were destroyed, and an additional one-third were injured by terrorists (FAO & WFP 2019). Terrorist actions increase citizens' insecurity as a result of their constant killing of people, destruction of belongings, and control of towns by Boko haram, resulting primarily in the migration of people from the area, exposing them to mistreatment, trafficking, sexual exploitation, and involuntary labor. Because of the ferocity, 1.5 million people have fled their homes (Foad et al., 2020). The educational sector is not immune to the negative consequences of terrorism. The terrorists burned down numerous schools, rendering education unattainable for children, displacing teachers, and making school supplies inaccessible. According to Foad et al. (2020) over 300 schools have been severely damaged, if not destroyed, and at least 196 teachers and 314 students have been killed between January 2012 and December 2014. According to the three main states that have been continuously attacked by Boko Haram, Borno state has been the most affected. According to Iwuoha & Onuoha (2021) the third base of reparations for deaths, destroyed homes, grazing, and infrastructure caused by the insurgency in Borno state is estimated to be around US\$ 5.9 billion for Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe, respectively, valued at 1.6 billion and US\$ 1.2 billion. Agriculture (3.5 billion dollars) and housing (3.5 billion dollars) account for three-quarters of total damages (3.3 billion Dollars). This research investigates the direct effects of Boko Haram activities on agriculture in Borno State.

## II. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Extremism comes from the Latin term *terrere*, which means "land." "To be terrified of" or "to shake." The term "terrorism" was coined during the French Revolution's Rule of Terror (1793-1794). The French state's Control of Horror campaign lasted a year and resulted in the deaths of between 16, 000 and 40, 000 people (Chukwuma, 2021). Terrorism is defined as the murder of people by non-state political actors for a variety of reasons, most commonly to make a political statement. According to US Federal Law, the term "terrorism" refers to planned, government-directed violence directed against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or secret operatives to incite a spectator response (Chukwuma, 2021). "International terrorism" refers to terrorism involving residents or territories from multiple countries. A "terror group" is defined as any group that engages in, or has major subgroups that engage in, international terrorism (Chukwuma, 2021). Azalan Meor (2018) painstakingly describes it as bent fighting used to achieve a larger goal that could be political, economic, religious, etc. Crooked warfare is an unfamiliar fight among non-belligerents that involves ambushing tactics for the annihilation of tougher rival sides. Terrorist groups have used this tactic to defeat Britain (in Palestine), France (in Algeria), and the United States (in Vietnam) despite being considered an inferior power. It is nearly impossible to defeat terrorists using this tactic without well-articulated, armed, funded, and specially trained personnel. This is most likely the government of Nigeria's predicament because they are fighting a war against a group of people who are difficult to identify and attack recklessly. According to the UNODC (2018) terrorism is defined as a planned use of force or threat of violence to achieve specific religious, ideological, or political goals through intimidation, force, or instilling fear. As the concept is broad, social, economic, and religious change may be its primary goals, as its actions are directed not only toward people but also toward belongings (Policy & To, 2020). Farming activities include crop cultivation or livestock husbandry in pure or integrated crop/animal production systems with the primary goal of producing food but also providing biomass for material and energetic use (Ilbery, 2017). Agriculture, along with forestry, is the economy's primary source of resource

production and supply, as well as the primary source of food, starch, sugar, and vegetable oil resources (Production, 2018). In this paper, we refer to the violent activities of Boko Haram terrorists in Borno State, which have hampered farmers' farming activities since the group's inception.

Several theories can be used to address the issue of insecurity and insurgency. However, this article is based on the Relative Deprivation Theory. Garry Runciman (1934-2020) and Ted Gurr (1936-2017) advocate the relative deprivation theory (Smith, 2019). The theory explains interpretive discontent caused by one person's relative position concerning another's state or position. This could be due to a lack of funds or time to support certain lifestyles, activities, and amenities to which an individual or group has grown accustomed. As a result, social exclusion is common, having a strong influence on behavior and attitudes, which are frequently cited as reasons for the emergence of social movements such as terrorism, riots, civil wars, and other manifestations of social deviation, which in extreme cases lead to politics (Bledsoe, 2018).

The theory explains how one person's relative situation concerning another person's situation or position leads to interpretive dissatisfaction. This could be due to a lack of resources or time to support certain lifestyles, activities, and amenities to which a person or group has become accustomed. As a result, social exclusion is widespread, and it has a significant impact on behavior and attitudes, which are frequently cited as reasons for the emergence of social movements, which in extreme cases lead to politics, such as terrorism, riots, civil wars, and other manifestations of social deviation (Bledsoe, 2018).

The theory of relative deprivation can also be used to investigate the behavioral consequences of perceived or real deprivation sensations. The actions of a deprived and aggrieved individual or group are a manifestation of the behavioral effects of seeking their rights to achieve social fulfillment. As observed by Smith et al. (2012) social contentment is the polar opposite of relative deprivation. As a result of the extrajudicial assassination of their commander, who was in police custody, the Boko Haram terror group felt deprived and offended, and resorted to violence. Boko Haram chose to wage an insurgency against Nigeria, in my opinion, because they have lost all hope of restoring societal contentment. This idea is consistent with UNDP's (2010) claim that marginalized individuals or groups will use any means available to them, including violence, to alleviate their unfavorable situation and circumstances. Peaceful protests across the country for infrastructure development, self-determination, basic health and education services, and social justice have gone unanswered in some cases; security forces have met these basic demands with savage brutality. The circumstances described above provided moral necessity and justification, as well as an enabling environment for violent conflict. As a result, the Boko Haram terrorism was unsurprising; the conflict had only been brewing for a while.

Using this theory of relative deprivation to explain the problem of terrorism and its effect on agricultural activities in Borno state in Nigeria's northeast Geopolitical zone, one can easily conclude that the Boko Haram terrorist group began its radical response of bombing and killing Nigerians, including farmers, as a result of the government's level of political deprivation. It is widely reported that the sect was not violent at first, until the government of Borno State cracked down on them, resulting in the death of the leader, Mohammed Yusuf, in 2009 (On et al., 2014; Sule et al., 2019; Ekpa et al., 2020; IEP, 2020). In response, the group has terrorized the country, particularly the northeast region of Borno state, killing over 30,000 people, destroying properties worth billions of naira, and displacing over two million people (Sule et al., 2019).

The diagram below (figure 2.1) illustrates the theoretical framework used to explain why this study adopted the relative deprivation theory.




Figure 2.1: Relative Deprivation Theory Theoretical Framework (By the Author)

When this relative deprivation theory is applied to the problem of Boko Haram terrorism and its impact on agricultural activities in Borno state, northeast Nigeria, it is easy to conclude that the Boko Haram terrorist group began its radical response of bombing and killing Nigerians as a result of the government's level of political deprivation.

### III. MATERIALS AND APPROACHES

According to Faso & Faso (2020) and Oxford Research Group (2017) the advent of Terrorism in the North-Eastern Geopolitical zone of Nigeria, The West Africa Country Nigeria, since her Independence in 1960 has been precious by sequences of terrorist sets, the greatest protuberant of them as well as most pertinent to this work is the Boko Haram. Boko Haram is a fundamental Islamic Group with the meaning of Hausa (Western Education is forbidden). Though, the Setis formally identified as Jama'at Ahlis Sunnah Lidda' watiwal Jihad connotation 'persons dedicated to the proliferation of the Prophet's teaching as well as Jihad'. This set has been dynamic in the Country since 2009 with a sequence of attacks on human lives and belongings generally in the northeastern parts of Nigeria as well as pouches of spell in the central area. The reason behind its development and the level of its action is best unspoken inside the demographics of the Country (Jelilov et al., 2018; HRW, 2016).

The Country encompasses hundreds of ethnic collections, though the three major ethnic sets are Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, as well as Igbo, which signifies nearly 71% of the Country's populace. The Country is similarly divided among Christianity as well as Islam with a greater percentage of Muslims concerted in the north, central and south-western regions of the country, whereas the Christian counterpart controls the South-East as well south-southeast, and few states in the Central area like Plateau as well as Benue states. The Country's economy has constantly been an emerging gone with a GDP per capita in the year 2010 of \$2,396 as well in 2017 estimated to be 2,695 compared to a progressive country like the United Kingdom with a GDP of \$38,665 in 2010 and 2017 was estimated to be \$49,104 (Adebowale, 2019). Therefore, in 2015 nearly 53.5 percent of the Nigerian people lives under the income scarcity line of PPP \$1.90 each day despite the prosperity of petroleum incomes, meaning, Nigeria is Africa's major oil manufacturer, driving further than two million barrels of crude oil each day. Protuberant amongst the features upsetting the development of the Nigerian economy is corruption that stops the growth of proper infrastructural amenities, a feat the development of companies, as well as productions in link with her high population growth rate, has consequences in high joblessness as well as below-employ which brings about high poverty percentage. All the regions of the country North, South, East, and West are affected by the high poverty rate. Though, the Northern area takes the major amount in Nigeria (Initiative, 2017).

Nigeria's poverty analysis tells that the Northern region is the most affected. Going by the ratio of the people in the northeast as well as north-west political zones who are living lesser than the income poverty line of PPP \$1.90 each day is placed at 79% which surpasses the normal average of 53.5% (OPHI, 2017). The region's tall poverty proportion rises as a result of insufficient economic openings for the increasing populace, social as well as religious performs that impact their level of edification and wealth making particularly for the women, spreading income disparity, as well as dishonesty (Ngbea & Achunike, 2014; Akubor, 2016).

Present uncertainty encounters of Boko Haram bedeviling the Northern area of the Country seen by scholarships as coming from two aspects: the increased poverty proportion detected in the area as well as the circumstance that northerners are mainly Muslims (Al., 2021; Jelilov et al., 2018; Kamta et al., 2020). On the other hand, some scholarships feature the reason for Boko Haram as the outcome of faintness in the society of politics and security amenities whereby delivered threats by a set of aggrieved persons to change politics are ignored therefore consequences in violence (Walker, 2012; Ette & Joe, 2019; Mbah et al., these 2017). Concerning poverty and war, there is a straight connection between these as the reality of war as well as uncertainty helps poverty and growing poverty emanates from war. In the Northeastern region of Nigeria, the high rate of poverty formed an exciting ground for the development of the Boko Haram terrorist set (Mbah et al., 2017).

Many scholars believe that Boko Haram terrorist group was formed in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf (1970 – 2009), the fundamental Islamist Minister in Maiduguri, Borno state. formed an Islamic college where the

merged Muslim paternities can train their kids to gain knowledge. Yet, being an Islamic minister with essential opinions, his secret reason for the college is to proliferate the formation of an Islamic state where Sharia laws will be the code of conduct (Thurston, 2016; Shuaibu & Salleh, 2015). Owing to that northeastern region of the country is a Muslim Conquered accounts for his hidden reason. Though Islamic Sharia rule was accepted in Borno state as well as crosswise the northern states in the 1990s, the minister wanted firm submission of Sharia law in the state-run. The minister intensely contrasted any Western system of democracy and mentioned the education arrangement that was employed by the Christian British colonial leaders as the reason of dishonesty and societal ills which saturates the Nigerian culture. Henceforth, the school presently developed to enlisting ground for upcoming jihadist (Islamic battalions) that was in no small means a hard duty owing to the tall level of shortage in the state-run. The minister assembled like-minded people who are upset about the economic ill of the state of unfortunate authority as well as the corrupt nature and later anticipated the Islamic rules as the lone choice for an ethical standing society and economically lively government. Another/shabby boy commonly recognized as Almajiri drove around the road to convert members of the set as they remained self-proclaimed to attain Islamic education. Though the early period this set was nonviolent in steering its activities and hence he effectively expanded enormous followership including youths mainly from deprived people. Advanced membership of the set prolonged to neighboring nations of Niger Republic as well as Chad. In that same period, the set leader (Mohammed Yusuf) stretched his station from Borno state alone to other Northern states like Kastina, Gombe, Bauchi, and Kano, as well as Yobe founding minor camps and schools in the aforementioned states (De Montclos, 2014).

According to Forest (2012) nonviolent activities finished in the North Eastern particularly Borno State in the year 2009 when Boko Haram set had a straight clash with Nigerian Police personnel. When the law was just passed in the State that directed the wearing of motorbike helmets by all the riders, though, the Boko Haram followers outrightly rejected to wear their helmets all through one of their trips as well angry at the Country's police for this contrivance the law on behalf of the rule. In this clash, Boko Haram 17 members were potshot to dead and this led to the group's-reprisal a few days far ahead by aggressively attacking the prison, schools police stations, churches, and police barracks in Borno and its global borders, there exists a strong connection among the state as well as her neighboring nations in trading for not agricultural crop alone likewise in factory-made goods, craft in skills as well as skills goods during the colonial time. From this time to after the colonial period, which gives growth of trade and business in Borno state area its admiration as well as reputation like the one the end of 1916, attracted eight European as well as Levantine companies to the area (Mukhtar et al., 2018; Jelilov et al., 2018; De Montclos, 2014).

According to Perouse DE Imam Abubakar Shekau emerge as the new leader of the Boko Haram set following the death of Mohammed Yusuf while the spiritual head spiritual Kabiru Abubakar Dikko Umar, aka "Kabiru Sokoto" who acted as the operative commander-in-chief in a more forceful way than the originator of the set – Muhammed Yusuf. They are more urbane in their actions, advancing from the use of machetes as well as minor weapons to heavy firearms and unpremeditated volatile strategies. Also, their spell's actions spread from just Borno as well as Bauchi states to the Northeastern states of Katsina, Kano, Gombe, Plateau, Yobe, Taraba, Adamawa as well as the Nation's capital Abuja. Also, extremist fierceness gets worse with spells falling over to bordering nations like Cameroon, and Niger Chad. The set activities in the Country affected in no small way the socio-economic events of these areas.

The Boko Haram terrorist spells reactive from 2009 to 2017, Persons in thousand were killed and Properties worth billions of Naira stayed devastated houses inclusive, colleges, marketplaces, and workplaces, these affect the socioeconomic events in these states as inhabitant s run away for their protection. In late 2014, over twenty cities as well as communities mainly in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states were in resistance to the terrorist set. The northeastern region of the Country is soundly identified for farming activities and the incidence of the militancy group has stuck on the agricultural activities as well as triggering food insecurity. This study focuses on Borno state and as such appraisal scholarships in the path.

#### **IV. THE EFFECTS OF BOKO HARAM AND AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES IN BORNO STATE**

According to Gaji (2017), IOM (2019), Guillery (1993), Waschke (2012) Torbjornson & Jonnson (2017) the Northeastern portion of Borno in the Country is surrounded by three states as well as three Nations. The State of Borno portions borders the Republics of Niger in the North, with Chad in the Northeastern part as

well as Cameroun in the East area. Inside the country, Borno state is bounded by Gombe State in the Western part, Yobe State to the North-West as well as Adamawa State in the Southern area.

Borno state is the second-largest state in the country with an area of 70,898sq km. Has 27 local government zones with numerous ethnic collections. The mainstay of the people in Borno state is farming majorly on crop production, groundnut fish farming, and livestock production (Babagana et al., 2018; NIRSAL, 2018; Akinyetun, 2018). The main crops cultivated in Borno State are groundnut, millet, sorghum, wheat, cowpea, soybeans, and vegetables such as onions, pepper, tomatoes, maize, and leafy vegetable garden eggs (Pindar et al., 2018; Plaisier et al., 2019; NET, 2018). They are also known for fishing around Lake Chad. The main livestock raised in the State is/ camel, cattle, goats, and sheep. The state skills its agricultural harvest inside and outside the Country. Its global borders give room to a healthy connection between the Country as well as her neighboring nations for trading not only for agricultural harvest but also for industrial goods, and occupation in craft and craft goods from the pre-colonial time (Pindar et al., 2018). Since this time to the post-colonial era, the development of commerce, as well as trade-in Borno part gives the area its status and reputation that by the close of 1916, brings eight European as well as Levantine companies to the area (PER, 2017; Jelilov et al., 2018).

Adding to this, to meet the needs of overseas companies boosted manufacturing in the area of cotton, gum as well as groundnut. Also, the fact that the Borno state and its instantaneous nationals from the other nations have alike structures like/ religion and social trust language, additional simplifies trade kindred. Also, the occurrence of inadequate source bequest at a time or the other in the Borno area, as well as its neighbors specifies the strong point of their exchange relationships. For example, all through Nigeria's civil war, the trade relationships remained relied upon for food as well as alike gesticulation was reimbursed all through the Chad civil war (Jelilov et al., 2018). Observed that the spoken international exchange doings in Borno state region is sums to closely 95% of whole trans-border exchange action with around 5 diverse interchange ways (Jelilov et al., 2018). Borno municipal aids as the station for conversation of mutually raw agricultural products as well as factory-made things, therefore making engagement openings for its inhabitants also a basis for economic development for the area. Yet, this development has been significantly pretentious by the actions of Boko Haram set from its initial spell in 2009 (PER, 2017).

As a result of the Boko Haram terrorism, huge hectares of farmland have been devastated, marketplaces burnt down, migration of persons from precious regions destined for cultivation of farmland, animal rearing, and fishing are abandoned, and their places of restriction for times destined the limit of business events, as well as the closing of global borders inside the area, restricted cross-boundary employment (Iwuoha & Onuoha, 2021). Socioeconomic events fell severely, the utmost of the areas was further down the regulator of the terrorist set, the educational organization was stranded with community schools burnt down (Iwuoha & Onuoha, 2021). Health segments including the primary healthcare centers also were burnt down and doctors were hired by the insurgents for their private usage (Repor, 2021). In 2016, the situation underway to progress owing to the change of the Country's government which was clever to tackle the Boko Haram set threat head-on. But, after 7 years of incessant spells in the northern area have left ample harm (Repor, 2021). As observed by the Bank (2015) estimation of around 20,000 people have been murdered in Borno state all through the vehemence, over 2.0 million persons were exiled, 956,453 (closely 30 percent) out of 3,232,308 private households were devastated, 5,335 schoolrooms incapacitated crosswise the primary schools, while in the secondary as well as tertiary institutes. Again, 1,205 public, local government, or ministry structures, 76 police posts, 35 power offices, 14 prison structures, 201 health centers, 1,630 water sources, 726 power sub-posts as well as the supply lines (Bank, 2015). Also, games, woodland, as well as graze reserves, groves, river basins, and lakes, were infected in 16 of the 27 zones, as well as 470,000 cattle were killed or stolen (Bank, 2015). As the entire total harm was placed at 5.9 billion dollars.

Scholars on the effect of terrorist set actions in the country are focused on the outcome of terrorism on food security essentially owing to the encounters of the precious people to see their rudimentary food requirements. According to Agwu (2020), Dunn (2018), Jelilov et al. (2018), Thurston (2016), Granville (2020), and FAO (2019). Boko Haram set actions to affect food security in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state is studied. With the research data meant foredated 2012-2013 from 222 respondents, which discovered that external traders abandoned their trades, practically Borno state has been distorted totally, the paramount part is the agricultural segment with a high price of farm harvest (Mahmood & Ani, 2018). In the same study conducted by Abdullahi (2021) Boko Haram insurgency effect in Borno state is studied with the use of primary as well as secondary figures. Documented by the

World Bank(2020)influence of war in the Northeast region of the Country on Agricultural Worth chains is studied in Borno State. 4 worth chains are focused upon by 4respondents they are altogether farmers that witness the Warin its wholeness. To that of the crop worth chain, considerable failure is detected in the normal production of main crops e.g., maize, cowpea, rice, and millet. Additionally, the volume of fish reaped throughout the time fell considerably to nearly80%. The livestock production and the incapability to enter marketplaces ran to a high rate of livestock. Finally, the agriculture-associated worth chain practiced a harmful effect which dropped the confidence in investors as well as a reduced amount of venture in agricultural development detected from zones that are extremely pretentious by the activities of the Boko Haram group.

## V. METHODS AND RESULTS

In this analysis, five data groups are used that is yearly terrorism linked to murders, the worth of loans established by farmers, the yearly rainfall, cultivated part yearly, as well as the manufactured crop yearly. The Statistics gotten tell precisely Borno municipal yearly meant for the period 1998 – 2015, while information on insurgence connected to killings starts in 2009. Yearly statistics on insurgence associated with killings were gotten from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) kept via the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism as well as Retorts to Terrorism(GTD, 2018). A loan worth getting by farmers, as well as yearly rain, was pulled out from the Central Bank of Country Numerical Statement 2016 as well as yearly harvest manufacture and the part cultured were mutually attained from the National Bureau of Statistics annual agricultural information.

Here is the experimental description:

$$AC_t = \beta_1 + \beta_2(INS)_t + \beta_3(LOAN)_t + \beta_4(RAIN)_t + \epsilon_t(1)$$

$$CP_t = \alpha_1 + \alpha_2(INS)_t + \alpha_3(LOAN)_t + \alpha_4(RAIN)_t + \gamma_t(2)$$

Were

- AC is the yearly area cultivated for farming in Borno state
- CP represents the yearly crop production in tons for 7 crops with cassava, cotton, garlic, ginger, sheanut sesame seed, and gum Arabic.
- INS represents the total number of fatalities in insurgency related activities.
- LOAN represents the value of an annual loan (in Naira) received by farmers.
- RAIN is the annual level of rainfall recorded in millimeters.

Singh(2012)Kaur et al.(2020)and Singh (2012) are closely related in the strategy of the model overhead. The 2 equations are projected in a way that equation 1 examines the connection among farm parts cultivated and the number of murders in insurgence-associated actions after monitoring for further reasons such as the worth of the loan as well as the total of rain which takes the tendency to affect the farm part cultured. Later the constant of attention here is  $\beta_2$ , which meant if positive shows insurgence has a constructive effect on agriculture, and if  $\beta_2$  is instituted bad then there is an adverse connection among the insurgence as well as agricultural occupational. Calculation 2, on the additional hand, investigate the connection among crop manufacturing number of murders in insurgence-associated actions after monitoring for further features by way of calculation 1. Yet again, the focus is on  $\alpha_2$  which we assume to have an adverse sign demonstrating that crop manufacture is harmfully precious by insurgence in Borno municipal. As the summary figures for the statistics is revealed in table 1.

**Table 1: Summary Figures**

| Variable | No. of Observation | Mean      | SD        | Min     | Max        |
|----------|--------------------|-----------|-----------|---------|------------|
| AC       | 18                 | 20,566.67 | 11,061.97 | 5260.00 | 54500.00   |
| Loan     | 18                 | 67,334.83 | 56092.42  | 854.00  | 194,570.00 |
| Rain     | 18                 | 643.25    | 138.00    | 393.00  | 917.30     |
| INS      | 18                 | 696       | 1591      | 0       | 5529       |
| CP       | 18                 | 50261.11  | 34,919.55 | 3340.00 | 129700.00  |

When the statistics above are applied to the problem of Boko Haram terrorism and its impact on agricultural activities in BornoState, northeast Nigeria, it is easy to conclude that the Boko Haram terrorist group has done more harm than good to the agricultural sector in Borno State, Northeast Nigeria.

**Table 2: Effect of terrorism on agriculture in BornoState**

|              | 1<br>AC              | 2<br>CP              |
|--------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| INC          | -0.753<br>(1.456)    | -10.047**<br>(4.846) |
| Loan         | 44.608**<br>(18.262) | 57.431<br>(60.761)   |
| Rain         | 18<br>0.418          | -0.111<br>(0.148)    |
| Observations | 18                   | 18                   |
| R2           | 0.418                | 0.342                |

\*Indicates results significant at p-value <1% and \*\* signifies results significant at p-value < 5%

Source: Field survey 2022 compiled by Author

When the statistics above are applied to the problem of Boko Haram terrorism and its impact on agricultural activities in BornoState northeast Nigeria, it is easy to conclude that the Boko Haram terrorist group's violent activities have affected the agro sector of BornoState negatively since its inception.

Two (2) model results are displayed in Table 2. Model 1 outcomes revealed in the 2 columns of the board that classifies a harmful relative among killings associated with insurgence as well as the hectares of land urbane in Borno municipal through an additional two-variable quantity in the classically a helpful connection. These symbols in relationships of positivity or unhelpfulness for the three-variable quantity in model 1 disclose outcomes that are undistinguished able ample probable. This shows that the part cultivated rises with an upsurge in rain as well as a rise in the worth of loans accessible to agriculturalists. Nevertheless, this partly cultivated declines by the upsurge in the volume of insurgence-connected murders. The alike result is gotten for model 2 through the exclusion of rain. Also, model 2 shows that the number of production declines as a result of a rise in the amount of insurgence connected to demises. Though results for part cultured and insurgence are not noteworthy, the relative among harvestman facture and insurgence is statistically important at 5%. R-squared for the 2 models is fairly small worthless than 50%. The main contest here is the incomplete number of sovereign variables existing in the models, which happened owing to the absence of statistics. It will be debated in detail in the latter segment.

**Table 3: Relationship Matrix for Model Variable Quantity**

|      | AC        | LOAN      | RAIN      | CP        | INS      |
|------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| AC   | 1.000000  | -         | -         | -         | -        |
| LOAN | 0.340793  | 1.000000  | -         | -         | -        |
| RAIN | 0.350044  | -0.398302 | 1.000000  | -         | -        |
| CP   | 0.093218  | -0.237470 | 0.359885  | 1.000000  | -        |
| INS  | -0.221240 | -0.067805 | -0.135375 | -0.476447 | 1.000000 |

Source: Authors compiling information

Going by the relationship matrix shown above, it reveals that the connection among crop production, as well as terrorists on one hand and partly cultivated and terrorists, on the other hand, remain together bad, though, a tougher relative exists for terrorist murders as well as the number of crops produced in contrast to the added connection.

## VI. BOKO HARAM TERRORISM IN NORTH-EAST NIGERIA: The Way Forward

Boko Haram terrorism has undoubtedly had a significant impact on agricultural activities in Borno state. Despite their magnitude, the challenges are not insurmountable. As such the following suggestions are made to assist the country in dealing with the consequences:



Nigeria's government should continue to collaborate with foreign nations such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, China, and others in the fight against terrorists due to technological and security advancements. To boost morale and enable them to defeat the Boko Haram terrorist group, additional personnel should be brought into Nigeria's security agencies, particularly the military. Again, the government should prioritize personnel welfare, and descendants of war heroes should be provided with scholarships and remuneration.

Nigeria's security agencies should be efficient by allowing their men to search for the rebel group to avoid extra-judicial killings and other forms of human rights abuse against group members and other blameless citizens. People accused of belonging to the terrorist organization Boko Haram should be prosecuted, the government's intelligence-gathering apparatus should be modernized. Sophisticated weapons and technological apparatus capable of locating the group's location, detecting, and degrading the effective bomb. Local broad-based management and prevention initiatives involving all regional and international stakeholders, as well as context-specific and multi-layered conflict resolution, are required.

The government of Nigeria should address the country's unemployment issue, both in the north and throughout the country. It could be accomplished by instituting socioeconomic programs to employ the unemployed Nigerian youths who are being used as a tool by Boko Haram to carry out their violent actions.

Nigeria should implement an educational policy in the Northeast region that allows poor children, particularly those in Northern Nigeria's Almajiri system, to receive Western education by constructing schools or colleges.

The Nigerian government should prosecute those indicted for assisting the Boko Haram group to cut the group's source of funding for urbane arms for their violent actions. However, the national government should encourage a national conference that will bring people from different ethnic groups together as well as serve as a platform for inter-religious dialogue to achieve harmonious coexistence among the compilations.

There is no smoke without fire or the conflicts of life. Several factors contribute to terrorism in Nigeria. Terrorism in society is the result of vices spreading everywhere, such as corruption in both open and closed sectors, bribery of the highest order, weak and bad governance, injustice, nepotism, condemnation of innocent citizens, racism, political crimes, and so on. In a country rich in natural resources that can benefit its economy. Sincerity in policy implementation and governance will go a long way toward improving citizen well-being and preventing citizens from feeling deprived, which will lead to frustration and violence against the government.

The group will continue to destabilize the country's northeast, and its violent activities will spread to other parts of Nigeria. As a result, the government should address the issue of poverty and corruption as soon as possible, and encourage investment in the Northeast region to promote transparency and public discourse, paving the way for a sustainable response to the ferocity as well as terrorism against the country, bringing lasting peace and fostering agricultural activities and food security in the Borno state, the region, and Nigeria at large.

## **VII. CONCLUSION**

These studies the relative among agricultural activities as well as terrorists in Borno state from 1998 to 2015. Agricultural activities are hooked on 4 sets. This means the quantity of part cultured, yearly yield manufacture, nurture of livestock, and fish agriculture are the main agricultural occupation of the inhabitants of Bornostate. Owing to restricted accessibility of information for the study, the livestock nurture, as well as fish agricultural, were released, through this homework directed on part urbane and entire produce manufacture. Among other features that affect agriculture is the accessibility of loans as well as satisfactory weather situations henceforth the motive for the inclusion in the replicas appraised. As the two models 'Outcomes specify the existence of terrorism effect on agricultural activities in Bornostate

Consequently, the necessity to stop the recurring rebellious spells in that region cannot be over-emphasized. Also, the affected farmers must be rewarded with palliatives that will permit them to regain their farming volumes for effective food production. Also, youth empowerment programs can be planned in the Zone to help reorient the youths from being enlisted into the group.

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