

# THE INTERCONNECTIVITY AMONG TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS AS SOURCE OF UNENDING GLOBAL INSECURITY

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## **Abstract**

*The issue of Al Qaeda, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Boko Haram insurgency have become monster that threaten global peace and security in contemporary times. Just as terrorism and terrorist acts have continued to wax stronger over the years, terrorist organisations are intensifying their lethal attacks worldwide through alliances and collaborative efforts. This paper investigated the interconnectivity among terrorist organisations with a view to unraveling whether such is the source of unending global insecurity or not. It adopted a descriptive research method, while data was obtained through secondary sources of data collection and alliance theory was used to explain the discourse. The paper observed that terrorist organisations, which abound in large number, usually connect with other stronger organisations with similar radical ideological orientation, to access fund, equipment, logistics and share information. It revealed that the interconnectivity amongst terrorist organisations remains a significant source of unending global insecurity besides, among others, the doggedness of their leadership. It concluded that the world will know no peace and there will be no end to terrorist attacks until terrorist organisations are dismantled or their strength fiercely*

*weakened. It recommended that state actors such as leadership of nations and international organisations should join forces together, and collaborate in other spheres to intensify attacks on terrorist organisations and their financiers, while world bodies like the United Nations should place heavy sanctions on them and their collaborators. Also, the bank accounts of these organisations and their cronies should be frozen and taken over by world bodies in order to weaken their capacity to wreak havoc on mankind.*

**Keywords:** Connections, Global security, Insecurity, Interconnectivity, Terrorist organisations,

## **Introduction**

Terrorism has become a common parlance in the contemporary world and it has grown to become one of the well organised and complicated phenomena in the modern era, while the present wave of terrorism has equally posed a threat that can never be easily alienated (Okore & Odinakachukwu, 2022). Terrorism is not a recent development in human history. Throughout human history, those who wanted to overthrow nations, kings, and princes such the Taliban and Al-Shabab have utilised violence to achieve their goals. It is possible to distinguish this type of

violence from what is currently the trend of terrorism, because soldiers and those in power are frequently the targets of anti-government violence. However, the use of violence against civilians with the stated intention of inciting fear or panic among the populace to gain media attention is what defines terrorism in recent times (Jackson, 2021). Terrorist attacks have shaken the international environment and would continue to be a force to contend with. Terrorism did not start from the 21<sup>st</sup> century but the September 11, 2001 attacks on the New York and Washington buildings, which was masterminded by Al-Qaeda, the Islamic extremist terrorist network and resulted in the killing of thousands of people, remains a landmark and most traumatic event for the world (Jackson, 2021).

According to Global Terrorism Index (2022), there were 5,226 attacks in 2021 alone, Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 48% of global terrorism deaths. Myanmar had the largest rise in terrorism with deaths increasing 20 times to 521 deaths in 2021. Terrorist attacks in the world have led to over 281,177 deaths between 2006 and 2020 alone (*Statista*, 2022). Statistics indicate that there are over one hundred terrorist organisations wreaking havoc all over the world with Asian and African countries being the most affected regions of the world. Asia for instance, is ravaged by the rage of radical Islamic extremist organisations such as the famous Al-Qaeda, the recent most notorious and fastest expanding Islamic network (Hubbard, Schmitt & Rosenberg, 2021). Other terrorist networks include Islamic States of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Hamas and Hezobollah in Pakistan, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Al Nusrah in Syria and many others, which are extending their stronghold to many African nations (Dominic, 2018). In Africa, the Boko Haram insurgent group is most popular, Lord Resistant Army in Egypt, Al-Shabaab in Somalia and other parts of East Africa (ODNI, 2019; Dominic, 2018). Most of these terrorist organisations make use of the same tactics and methods to draw the attention of the media. Terrorist tactics

includes bombings of different kinds, assassination, kidnapping, arson among others.

More so, terrorist organisations do not operate in isolation as the economics of the situation will not allow for strictly independent actions. All terrorist groups are limited by the three (3) Rs; resources, reciprocity, and reach. Resources represent means, reciprocity represents the open and mutual exchange of ideas between parties, and reach represents an effective body of reliable, like-minded contacts (Kelvin & Hensgen, 2007). The same as any group vying for limited resources, terrorists look for partners. Generally speaking, money, technology, labour, and information are scarce resources. For instance, Osama bin Laden and Aymar al Zawahiri, the head of Egypt's al-Jihad (Holy War) organisation, forged an alliance in the early 1990s. The 1998 attacks on the two American embassies in Africa were blamed on this cooperative coalition (Kelvin & Hensgen, 2007).

Funding plays a significant role for terrorist organisations which cannot be overstated and downplayed. Terrorist organisations for instance, will not survive for long without funding in terms of weapons, training, finances, information sharing and logistics. Large scale attacks require a lot of funding to be highly successful. Terrorist organisations therefore, need a lot of funding, both for the actual execution of terrorist attacks as well as for other purposes, such as upkeep of the organisation's operations, basic technical requirements, and costs associated with disseminating related ideologies (Christiana, 2019). Many terrorist organisations do not have enough funding or resources to carry out operations and run their organisations. This challenge of continual survival constrains them to join forces with other strong terrorist organisation to grow and carry out intensified attacks. Cooperation among terrorist organisations helps them to share resources and every other supply not to only successfully carry out their terrorist acts but also shield them from being wiped out thereby preserving their longevity. Such example is the situation when members of the

Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram received explosives training at Al-Qaeda camps in the Sahel region of northern Africa (Prieur, 2012).

These alliances strengthens the bonds and tightens the connections among all these terrorist organisations making them a formidable force and accounts for the major reason for the unending terrorist acts despite the war against terror launched and supported by many nations of the world.

Against this backdrop, the paper attempted the interconnectivity among terrorist organisations as the source of unending global insecurity. In order to achieve this objective, the paper was divided into five segments aside the introduction, The first section treated the concepts and the theoretical framework, the second part examined the dynamics propelling interconnectivity among terrorist organisations, while the third aspect ex-rayed the global efforts at decimating terrorists' interconnectivity. The fourth segment evaluated global efforts against terrorist organisations and the last part gave the conclusion and offered recommendations.

### **Conceptualising Global Insecurity**

Security and insecurity are ancient phenomena, which need no definite introduction. Insecurity is a situation in which there is no guarantee of protection against recurring threats including terrorism, starvation, sickness, repression, and environmental catastrophes. It may also imply lack of protection against abrupt and painful changes to routines. Okpaga, Ugwu and Eme (2012) identified insecurity as the lack of peace and security, whether it is due to historical, religious, ethno-regional, civil, social, economic, or political factors, which have fueled recurrent conflicts experienced over the years and have led to loss of lives and wanton destruction of property.

Global insecurity therefore, refers to the absence of peace, harmony and mutual understanding among international actors, both state and non-state actors, the condition which is frequently brought about by differences in ideologies, philosophies,

socio-economic conditions, political systems, and religion schisms leading to global terrorism, religious dogmatism, socio-economic violence, political and national sabotage, racism, tribal wars, and ongoing civil unrest, among others. Every violation of the world's peace, no matter how insignificant, can also be interpreted as a threat to the socio-economic, political, or religious order on a worldwide scale. This is the reason why various social, political, economic, and even more religious extremists are in a state of extreme rivalry, competition, and belligerence. The push for sectarian demands breeds global insecurity, which encourages lawlessness, anarchy, and self-help in defiance of international rules and practices (Adeoluwa, 2018).

Nwaobi (2013) aptly remarked that the ongoing focus on conventional combat between and within nations has been augmented by emerging dangers like organised crime, human trafficking, civil unrest, and terrorism. In other words, risks are changing as a result of fresh threats to stability brought up by transnational organised crime. Global insecurity in this discourse is thus regarded as the threat to world peace and security, which may be caused by religious fundamentalism as in the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and environmental crisis as in the case of oil spillage in the Niger Delta area in Nigeria, which led to the emergence of Niger Delta militancy.

### **Explaining Terrorism and Terrorist Organisations**

Terrorism is a controversial term that has dominated the debate of many scholars for a long time due to the complexity in its nature and dimension. The term "terrorism" originated from the "war of terror", which dated back to the late 18th century French Revolution of 1789 and led by Robbiépierre Maximilein. The terminology crept into political lexicon when he executed all antagonist of the French revolution thereby succeeded in installing a new dictatorship rule for the stability of the French nation. The

word “*terroriste*” meaning terrorist was first used in 1974 by François-Noël Babeuf, a French philosopher to qualify Maximilien Robespierre’s Jacobin regime as a dictatorship (Palmer, 2014; Kellner, 2004). Crenshaw (2010) argued that the term gained prominence in the 1970s as a result of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict, the Northern Ireland conflict, the Basque conflict, and the operations of groups like the Red Army Faction.

However, there is no universally accepted definition for the term terrorism. The controversial nature of terrorism stemmed from the fact that both state and non-state actors have used and continue to use terrorist tactics due to factors surrounding national liberation and self-determination, the political and emotional charge and finally the religious justification put forward for its use as Ganor rightly advanced that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ (Frampton, 2021; Jerry, 2013).

Terrorism according to the United Nations (1994) is the criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them. Hoffman (2006) identified terrorism as inherently political in its goals and motivations, violent or, more importantly, violently threatening, intended to have long-lasting psychological effects beyond the immediate victim or target, carried out by a group with a clear chain of command or by a conspiratorial cell structure and committed by a sub-national group or non-state entity.

Just like with the challenge of defining terrorism, defining a terrorist organisation comes with a more profound difficulty with several reasons put forward by different scholars (Philip, 2015). Most terrorist acts are consequently a part of a campaign by a particular group with distinct political objectives, mobilisation concerns, structure, and other organizational

characteristics. Unaffiliated terrorist actions are uncommon. Terrorist organisations refers to groups of violent and ideological compatible persons, who come together to form an association for the reasons of inflicting deliberately calculated harm against the public or government for a political or religious cause. Philip (2015) conceived terrorist organisations as sub-national political groups that engage in terrorism. Terrorist organisation is a group of people involved in planning, coordinating, and managing terror attacks with tactical and strategic objectives of using terrorist acts. Terrorist organizations, on the other hand, maintain secrecy in order to prevent prying by the police or law enforcing personnel and rivals groups (Shapiro, 2013). Shapiro further argued that terrorist organizations are any that have existed for at least a year and whose use of force consistently violates the laws of armed conflict, including the principles of distinction and proportionality. A group of people affiliated with a non-state organization that utilizes terrorism to further its goals and possesses a sort of command and control is referred to as a terrorist organization (Jones & Libicki, 2008). Organizations that use terrorism to further their political objectives are referred to as terrorist groups (Weinberg, 1991).

Terrorist organisations are formed basically on two dimensions; one, as a result of religious extremism such as Islamic fundamental extremism, and a shared feeling to bring liberation to un-Islamic agenda and ideology of such nation. This is the most common reason associated with contemporary trends in terrorism and terrorist organisations, Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Taliban are typical examples of these terrorist organisations. Terrorist organisations are also borne out of spontaneous triggers in the environment, more like coming from a political dissatisfaction or dissent against an illegitimate government in power. Ideally, Boko Haram started as a political dissent against the government in power in Nigeria but later evolved and had a mixed faction of

Islamic fundamental extremism driving its activities (when its founding leader, Yusuf was gruesomely killed in police custody

under suspicious circumstances) (Robert, 2013). Table 1 shows a list of foremost terrorist organisations in the world.

**Table 1: List of Foremost Terrorist Organisations in the World:**

S/No	Name of Terrorist Organisations	Region of Operation	Reported Attacks
1.	Islamic State	Worldwide	5,665
2.	Taliban	Afghanistan, Pakistan	4,675
3.	Boko Haram	Western Africa (Nigeria), Central Africa	1,634
4.	Al-Shabaab	Eastern Africa (Somalia)	1,619
5.	Maoists	India, Nepal	1,102
6.	Al-Qaeda	Worldwide	550
7.	Abu Sayyaf	Philippines, Malaysia	240
8.	Janjaweed	Sudan	203
9.	Al-Nusrah Front	Western Asia	195
10.	Garo National Liberation Army	India	103

**Source: World Data, 2021**

Terrorist organisation are funded from many sources, such as collections from protection fees and taxes, drug trafficking, money laundering, cybercrimes, ransom from kidnapping, arms trafficking, donations from wealthy private individuals, donations from arms merchants, supports from even state actors who sympathise with their cause (Christiana, 2019; *Council of Europe, 2019*).

### **Theoretical Framework**

The study adopted the alliance theory as its theoretical underpinnings to explain the interconnectivity amongst terrorist organisations. Alliance theory is a social anthropological theory that examines the formation and maintenance of alliances between people, organizations, and countries in order to explain the dynamics of social connections. It has been used to explain everything from small-scale interactions between family members to international diplomacy among nations, multinational

corporations and non-state actors. Though there existed different variants of alliance theory, all strands of the theory, however, share a common focus on the ways in which people cooperate and compete with one another to achieve their goals (Claudine, 2022). The goal of alliance theory is to explain how and why people form and keep alliances. It is predicated on the idea that alliances are formed strategically, as opposed to at random, to further the interests of the parties involved.

Alliance Theory has its roots in the work of French anthropologist, Claude Levi-Strauss, who is most known for developing the idea of structuralism. Levi-Strauss suggested in *The Savage Mind* (1962) that the reciprocity principle underlies the formation of allegiances. He proposed that organisations trade products and services to maintain a balance between what they give and receive. According to the theory, there are four key reasons why groups align

themselves with others or agencies. They are to gain access to materials not present in their immediate environment; safeguard them against harm or potent enemy; elevate one's standing; and influence in politics or society (Levi-Strauss, 1962).

Alliance theory is centered on the principle of reciprocity, although the model has grown today and been improved over time. The American anthropologist, Marshall Sahlins in his "Stone Age Economics" (1972) made a significant contribution by arguing that alliances are about more than just trading goods and services. For him, they are also about forming social bonds. According to Sahlins, people make partnerships to elevate their social rank and reputation. He further canvassed that the higher the social rank of the persons engaged, the more valuable the resources that are traded. Other anthropologists have since developed this theory, arguing that alliances can also be formed for purposes of political power or safety from harm.

In spite of its utility in elucidating on why people or associations enter into alliance, the theory has been criticised for being overwhelmingly reductionist and failing to take into cognisance the intricate web of connections that exist between people and groups. In addition, they have argued that the theory falls short in explaining why some alliances succeed, while others fail (Claudine, 2022).

However, the theory has been found very useful to the study of interconnectedness among terrorist organisations. Terrorist organisations in the world have common enemies and more often than not share the same ideological foundations of religious extremism. The bigger organisations are relatively looking for expansions, while the smaller ones cannot survive due to dearth of resource, reach and impact constraints. These challenges therefore, call for an alliance or partnership between and among many of these groups to commonly confront their arch enemies. In 2002, the Al Qaeda in expanding its organisation gave out \$3 million as support and starting out funds to the Boko

Haram group in Nigeria. So also information, weapons, training and other elements were given out as a seal of their alliance and support for expansionist agenda (Kogbara, 2021).

### **Dynamics Propelling Interconnectivity among Terrorist Organisations**

Terrorist organisations operate as a formal organisation in that they have a structure of command and control. Since the economics of the situation do not permit rigorous independent actions, scholars averred that terrorist groups rarely engage in independent operations due to their limitations, which include scarcity of sufficient resources in terms of technologies, labour; information, and the quest for constant network of dependable allies for their continued existence just like every other organisation (Kelvin & Hensgen, 2007). They argued that alliances show a new, mature aspect of the terrorism phenomenon. This represents the maturity, experience, feeling of duty, and mental or emotional stability of the organization. Entering into relations with other organisation is typically advantageous and a reasonable step for the majority of organisations that intend to survive hardship. The characteristic that ensures the maturity and continuity of an entity is to be able to trace and confirm that they possess and exhibit an organisation's identity.

Many of these organisations must network with larger, compatible groups in order to grow. These organisations may have different philosophies, objectives, rivals, or sponsors, but growth is a strong incentive for them to work with less experienced groups. Indicators of growth in a group or organization include networking to forge alliances or acquire resources, which also creates a semblance of a track-able path (Kelvin & Hensgen, 2007). More often than not, terrorist organisations focus sharply on competence and give out their non-core task to other terrorist organisations who are specialists in such fields to carry it out on their behalf.

Fair (2004), Basile (2001) and Cameron (1999) advanced that there are certain connections among terrorist organisations tagged “*hard links*”. These links includes financial support, information sharing, coordinated activities, safe enclaves and materials resources, and personnel. These items constitute the basis for the continued smooth running of the organisation to carry out their tasks in certain capacity. While scholars like Wiemann (2005), Picco (2005) and Hegland (2004) identified certain links called the “*soft*” links, they argued that these links do not necessarily involve direct communication but are important to the drive of the organisation. These links include political ideologies and beliefs, opportunities and chances, and even media control or propaganda. Connections amongst terrorist organisations help these organisations achieve goals by tapping into resources held by other parties. In many cases, the goals of many terrorist organisations will remain unrealistic and unachievable without the acquisition or presence of these connections.

It is fascinating to note that these connections strengthen the plans of terrorist organisations to pull up attacks that continually shake the global community. There are considerably not so much information as regards how, where and when these terrorist organisations sign their alliances and partnership deals, release information and knowledge and importantly command and control their structures towards getting the requisites. However, a few of the revealed information and insights into these connections give clear evidences of terrorist organisations connecting with one another to continue causing and wreaking havoc on the global world.

One of the significant factors propelling interconnectivity among terrorist organisations is funding. Terrorist organisations need funds to carry out a lot things ranging from acquisition of weapons, purchase of food supplies, drugs and toiletries, maintenance of camp sites or their safe havens. Smaller terrorist organisations do not sufficiently have this required fund to

keep up with their plans and execute them effectively. Many of them do not have strong involvement in drug and human trafficking, protection fees collection and other large sources of income that can bring in sufficient funds to sustain the organisation. In 2002, Al Qaeda supported Boko Haram with the sum of over \$3million dollars for running cost, acquisition of weapons, and as startup funds to execute it plans in Nigeria (Kogbara, 2021). Kogbara (2021) affirmed that the Islamic State in West Africa, a splinter group of Boko Haram was able to secure unspecified funds from Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Al Qaeda provided funds to the Abu Sayyaf terror group in the Philippines, which was responsible for kidnapping and murder of Western Europeans and Americans (Boettcher, 2001).

The desire to acquire weapons and military support is a cogent reason behind interconnectivity among terrorist organisations. Terrorist organisations provide and exchange weapons to facilitate their terrorist acts. According to Malik (2021), the Islamic State of West African Province, relies heavily on the strong elaborate support of ISIS networks to help move soldiers around West Africa. ISIS also supported the ISWAP with about 80 soldiers to help execute coordinated attacks in Nigeria. Brian (2015) contended that supports for the militarily ensure that terrorist organisations do not incur unnecessary high cost to carry out their plans. For instance, Lashkar -e-Taiba effectively reduce personnel cost when it decided to attack India’s major cities by accepting military support from Indian Mujahideen (IM) instead of recruiting new members or transporting their military wing from Kashmir (Michelle, 2021; Brian, 2015).

The need for trainings and training facilities is a potent factor for interconnectivity among terrorist organisations. When allies are invited to take part in events, there are physical interactions among terrorist organisations in alliances. Terrorist organisations share training camp sites, help to train the military wing of other terrorist organisations, and allow them to

share their safe havens and launch pads (Boettcher, 2001). In Afghanistan, Al Qaeda and the terrorist organisation of Harakat-al-Mujadin exchanged training facilities. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT), which is based in Pakistan was formed in 1990 as the military wing of Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI, or Center for Islamic Call and Guidance). It offered Al Qaeda trained operatives and other radical Islamic organizations fighting in Bosnia, Chechnya, and the Philippines in late 1990s (Weaver, 2003).

Al Qaeda's alliance with the Algeria's Armed Islamic Group (GIA) brought the allegedly connected "millennium plot" plan to blow up Los Angeles airport (LAX) in 1999. Ahmed Ressam, author of the plot, was an Algerian national who had received training in the use of small arms, such as machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, as well as explosives and poison gas, as well as assassination, sabotage, and urban warfare techniques from Al Qaeda (*Frontline*, 2014). Al Qaeda is in contact with the Lebanese Hezbollah organization, though the alliances began in the late 1990s, Al Qaeda received explosives and demolition training from Hezbollah. In the same vein, both Jemaah Islamiyah, which is based in Indonesia, and Lashkar I Jhangvi, based in Pakistan, got training from Al Qaeda (Boettcher, 2001). Al Qaeda provide comprehensive training to the Abu Sayyaf gang in the Philippines, which accepted responsibility for kidnapping and murdering Western European and American citizens.

Information and knowledge sharing constitute a factor for interconnectivity among terrorist organisations. Terrorist organisations rely on their alliances for local information. This can include information on the government, the physical environment, the nature of the military and intelligence services and financial services. Tracing back through history, one can see that the entire pre-preparations for the 9/11 attacks occurred by information communication. The GIA (Armed Islamic Group of Algeria) may have been the source of knowledge for Al Qaeda's 2001 attacks in the United States (Boettcher,

2001). Michelle (2021) perceived that the Lashkar-e-Taiba provided suitable surveillance information and successfully planned out the 2010 bombing of German bakery in India.

Kelvin and Hensgen (2007) concurred that terrorist organisations also use licensing agreements to enable them utilise a good or service owned by terrorist allies for a pre-determined length and purpose due to the fact that they do not control the source of this knowledge. Terrorist organisations, which are small or naïve focus on the act to be carried out. For them, taking part in the anarchic act is sufficient. The acts of a beginner terrorist are typically constrained by lack of resources, thus they do not require many agreements. Licensing agreements are frequently used by terrorist organisations for logistical support such as renting facilities or providing safe havens, dispatching soldiers and training camps (Kelvin & Hensgen, 2007). Al Qaeda is the largest licensing terrorist organisation allegedly known for having given out such support to Jemaah Islamiyah, a radical Islamic terrorist group, which operates in the Southeast Asian region, spanning locations such as Malaysia, Singapore, and the southern Philippine Islands used in the churches in Indonesia (Cronin, Huda, Adam & Benjamin, 2004).

Suffice to say that terrorist organisations carry out other kinds of agreements that bond them together to make them almost unable to be defeated and wipe out globally. Despite efforts in the war against terrorism, the numbers of attacks continue to rise terribly due to the fact that the networks connecting many of these terrorist organisations is such a cumbersome strand that can almost never totally be destroyed. Most of these terrorist organisations are so intertwined and connected in such a way that what differentiates them is just the titular name they bear. For instance, Al Qaeda is strongly connected to over 12 other terrorist organisations excluding ISIS, Taliban, and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, which makes the group super strong (Roggio, 2021; Mir, 2020).



In 2011 when the United States of America Naval Seal team killed Osama Bin Laden in his enclave in Pakistan, Ayman Zawahiri rose immediately to the office of the Emir of the group to continue the organisation’s plans and acts, with support from its strongest counterpart ISIS. While United States thought it would be the end of the organisation as announced by the 44<sup>th</sup> President, Barrack Obama and celebrated by citizenry, it was a surprised wake up to attacks from the organisations in years that followed. Many a times when leaders of terrorist organisations are killed, these organisations do not die as another leader, who may be more ferocious in character takes over almost immediately and seeks for support and funding from other terrorist organisations to continue to exist and wreak havoc on humanity. The established relationships and connections among terrorist groups steadily strengthen them and provide them ample support for the continued existence.

**Global Efforts at Decimating Terrorists’ Interconnectivity**

Several efforts were put in place by stakeholders affected by terrorist acts to steadily alienate terrorism in their fight against their hold. After 9/11 terrorist attack, the United States alongside other sympathising nations, with the support of Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and actions that were killed via combats and drone strikes, among others.

United Nations through its Security Council launched series of counter-terrorism strategies that have proven to be successful to a considerable extent. First, the United States created Department of Homeland Security, Directorate of National Intelligence and National Counterterrorism Centre and empowered them with huge financial resources charging them to fight terrorism in the US and around the world.

Paramount among the counter-terrorism strategies are military actions and cutting of source of financing, among others. The military actions on terror launched in the wake of the 9/11 attack has proven to neutralise terrorist acts and destabilised their organisations to a large extent. The military strategy was primarily focused on Islamic extremist groups importantly the Al-Qaeda and the Islamic States of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) though their other international affiliates were also targeted. With the help of NATO’s invocation of Article 5 and a few other resolutions of the United Nations, a set of military troops was dispatched to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Philippines and the Horn of Africa with military bases stationed there. The military actions led to the killings of the major leaders of several terrorist groups and innumerable numbers of their members. Table 2 shows selected leaders of different terrorist organisa

**Table 2: List of Global Attacks Aimed at Decimating Terrorist Organisations**

S/N	Terrorist organisations	Leaders Attacked	Date of Attack	Place of Attack	Causalities (Including families)
1.	Al-Qaeda	Osama Bin Laden	May2 <sup>nd</sup> , 2011	Abbottabad, Pakistan	4
2.	Al-Qaeda	Al-Zawahiri	July 31 <sup>st</sup> , 2022	Kabul, Afganistan	1

3.	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria	Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi	October 27 <sup>th</sup> , 2019	Idlib Province, Syria	3
4.	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria	Abu Ibrahim al-Qurayshi	February 3 <sup>rd</sup> , 2022	Atmeh, Idlib Syria	7
5.	Al-Shabaab	Abdullahi Nadir Yare	October 1 <sup>st</sup> , 2022	Jilib, Mogadishu	27
6.	Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps	General Qassim Suleimani	January 3 <sup>rd</sup> , 2020	Baghdad Airport, Iran	Unspecified
7.	Abu Sayyaf	Majan Sahidijuan	March 21 <sup>st</sup> , 2021	Languyan, Philippines	unspecified
8.	Islamic State of West African Province	Sani Shuwaram	February, 2022	Sabon Tumbuns, Lake Chad	Unspecified
9.	Islamic State of West African Province	Musab al-Barnawi	August 23 <sup>rd</sup> , 2021	Marte, Borno State	Unspecified
10.	Boko Haram	Mohammed Yusuf	July 30 <sup>th</sup> , 2009	Maiduguri	Unspecified

**Source:** Compiled by Rosenje, M. O. & Omojowo, S. T. (2022).

As rightly emphasised, funding is what keeps the terrorist organisations up and running for continuous survival and longevity. Several efforts were put in place and directed at cutting of source of financing, especially by the United Nations through its resolution of International Convention for the Suspension of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) and also United States “Enduring Freedom Act” that continuously monitors and freezes any strange amount received and transaction made by foreigners or suspected person in the US and other terrorism torn nations. For example, in a joint effort in mid-2021, the United States Treasury Department designated Hassan al-Shaban for allegedly facilitating transfer of funds for Al-Qaeda in Turkey across North Africa, Europe and North America (*National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment, 2022*).

In an attempt to ambush transfer of funds to terrorist networks, many sham charities and other organisations, which created channels for financing of terrorist acts and support to terrorist organisations were proscribed. In late 2021, National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment (NTFRA) (2022)

reported that the Turkish authorities froze assets of Al-Fay Company, an ISIS financial facilitator that was earlier proscribed by the United State. According to NGO Monitor (2021), the Islamic Relief Worldwide was banned after series of illegal connections to many terrorist organisations on issues relating to funding of terrorist networks. Iyaz Ali, a Pakistani, was equally arrested after admitting to have transferred funds and assistance to Hamas terrorist organisation, which had been proscribed in Israel (*NGO Monitor, 2021*). In line with the foregoing explication, Daniel (2016) argued that the United States Treasury Department was able to reduce terrorist funding through several monitoring mechanisms placed on the source of ISIS funding, which comes majorly from oil and gas, taxes and levies in its territory. He affirmed that the counter-terrorism attack launched against ISIS territory in 2015 seriously disrupted the terrorist organisation from extracting, refining and transporting oil and gas. As a matter of fact, this affected the day to day running cost of the ISIS and payments of its personnel.

## Evaluating Global Efforts against Terrorist Organisations

While the fight against terrorism has been strikingly rewarding to a considerably extent, the fact remains that it has failed to totally wipe out terrorist organisations. As a matter of fact, terrorist attacks continue to grow steadily over the years. In Nigeria, the government has continued to oscillate between the use of extreme force, appeasement, amnesty and negotiation to respond to terrorist attacks (Akinbi, 2015; Fawole 2013). The levity with which the Nigerian government has handled the crisis, lacking in strong political will has weakened government's attempt at confronting the phenomenon head-on. The ISIS for instance, was responsible for over 2,705 attacks and 8,147 deaths in 2021 alone (*Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2022*). Moody (2021) contended that despite the wars led by the United States and its allies against terrorism, the fight seems far from being over, as the goal to totally eradicate terrorist acts still looms unachieved.

The ongoing political occurrences in Afghanistan today indicate that United States overthrow of the Taliban government in Afghanistan two decades ago has proven to be a colossal failure on the long run. After all, the efforts of the United States were thwarted after the withdrawal of its troops, which led to the collapse of President Ashraf Ghani's government and a return to Taliban extremism in power in 2021. This singular action amounts to a total wastage of trillions of dollars, innumerable loss of civilian lives and that of the US troops. The entire escapade has been described as 'a *tragic and chaotic end*' (Moody, 2021; Zucchini, 2021). Ellen (2021) estimated the human cost of the war to a staggering 7,954 persons including American Service men, contractors and Allied's service members, such as NATO, aid workers, and journalists, excluding Afghan civilians (47,245), Afghan national military and police (66,000) as well as undiscovered bodies; with an estimated debt cost of 42trillion as at 2020.

More importantly, the war on terror in the Middle East especially Afghan and Somalia were characterised by several human rights abuses that continue to fuel terrorism in the region. The abuses were the decisive factor in the recruitment of terrorist membership, which increasingly undermine efforts towards stability, peace and security (Patricia, 2021).

## Conclusion Recommendations

Terrorist organisations' connections between and amongst themselves come from the basic fact that these organisations are run not just as criminal ones but strictly on business principles that gives them an edge over state actors that targets to see to their non-existence. However, until these connections are destroyed, the source of unending global insecurity remains undefeated and more continuous attacks on the peace and security of the global world is eminent.

In the light of the foregoing explication, the paper recommended that the sources of funding of terrorist organisations be strictly monitored and heavy sanctions on transactions be placed on foreigners and strangers who are found culpable for funding terrorists' networks. This would reduce terrorist use of conventional means of funds transfer thereby limiting how terrorist organisations raise and send funds to their allies. Also, joint military action of higher intensity should be embarked upon by the United Nations and other International Organisations in nations or regions where terrorism is most affected. This would no doubt reduce the impact of terrorism alliances in the global environment.

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